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ABSTRACT 
 
While a vast body of literature exists examining the causal mechanisms behind the negative 
effects of natural resource abundance on economic growth – the so-called ‘natural resource 
curse’ - an emerging body of literature can be seen which provides a more holistic 
perspective on natural resource governance. This emerging literature is especially relevant for 
the African continent, where the challenges of poverty, low levels of good governance, and 
histories of conflict and authoritarianism, make natural resource governance even more 
complex. Thus this study makes an in-depth examination of both the traditional and emerging 
literature in order to examine the shift that has occurred in the literature. To provide practical 
relevance to this literary shift, this study proceeds with two independent case studies of 
Ghana and Uganda. By practically analysing the existing institutional, legislative and 
regulatory frameworks in both countries, this study examines the areas of variation in the 
current practices as opposed to the policy prescriptions of the emerging literature. In this way 
this study makes recommendations for the future of petroleum governance in both countries. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
ith the recent surge of interest in Africa’s natural resource wealth, particularly 
with the discovery of significant deposits of oil in the region, traditional 
theories around what is widely referred to as the ‘natural resource curse’, need 
to be revisited and emerging theories considered, in order to understand the reality currently 
facing many countries on the African continent. In the past 50 years much data has emerged, 
documenting the paradoxically negative relationship between natural resource abundance and 
economic growth. With oil deposits having been discovered in several African countries in 
recent years, ranging from Ghana and Sierra Leone on the west coast, to Uganda and Kenya 
on the east coast, the issues of the ‘natural resource curse’, and even more specifically, of oil 
governance, are becoming ever more pertinent for the African continent. This is especially so 
in light of the growing global demand for oil, as well as diminishing global oil reserves in 
other parts of the world.1 Also, as the experiences of other oil rich African countries like 
Angola, the Sudan and Nigeria have shown, oil revenues do not always translate into 
improved socio-economic development2. This is often due to the fact that there are unique 
challenges faced by Africa, such as colonial legacies of poor institutions; histories of violence 
and civil war; low levels of good governance and education; high levels of poverty; and 
unstable or poor democracies.3 Thus, while traditional theories of natural resource 
governance do still have relevance, they are often too narrowly focused on economic and 
Political Economy variables, which only explain the resource curse in part. The policy 
prescriptions which have emanated from them have regularly been found to be inadequate 
when applied to the African continent. Emerging theories which encompass a broader set of 
variables arguably provide more robust and effective policy prescriptions for African 
countries. While some researchers, such as Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian,4 have analysed 
oil rich countries in Africa such as Angola and Nigeria, these studies were done on countries 
whose starting points were undemocratic or authoritarian regimes, where good governance 
mechanisms were not in place. Rather, this study will focus on two countries - Ghana and 
Uganda - to examine how the emerging theories of natural resource governance can be 
applied to upcoming democratic African oil rich countries, where good governance 
mechanisms are relatively robust.     
W 
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Ghana discovered offshore oil deposits in the 1970s but it was only in the 1990s that 
production began, with the involvement of American and Dutch oil companies.5 More 
recently, another offshore oil field – Jubilee Field - was discovered, with large commercial 
quantities of oil being expected. Commercial oil began flowing at the end of 2010, 
contributing an estimated seven percent to Ghana’s growth in 2011.6 In the case of Uganda, 
in 2006 a massive oil discovery was made inland, on the border of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC), in the Albertine region. This region runs along the length of Lake 
Albert, and indeed several of the oil blocks extend into the lake to the border of the DRC. The 
northern-most block is situated on the border with South Sudan, and the southern-most block 
reaches almost to the border of Rwanda.7 Following from this, the construction of an oil 
refinery in the region is due to begin later in 2012. Several oil contracts have also been signed 
by government.8 While much commentary has been made of the situation in these countries,9 
an analysis of each government’s policies and regulatory frameworks, as well as other 
indicators - like corruption, Gross Domestic Produce (GDP), and levels of good governance - 
is needed in order to assess the current positioning of each country within the emerging 
literature. This would help provide a possible indication of whether the discovery and 
production of oil in Ghana and Uganda will enable economic development, or whether more 
disagreeable consequences, are likely to result.  
 
Chapter Outline 
This research thus sought to explore the most recent literature surrounding the challenges of 
resource governance on the African continent, with particular reference to new resource-rich 
democratic countries, as well as revisiting the traditional natural resource governance 
literature to assess the applicability, or lack thereof, for African cases. This is followed by 
two independent case studies of Ghana and Uganda respectively, both of which only recently 
discovered oil. While Ghana can be said to be a model of good governance in Africa, in view 
of its relative democratic stability and stronger democratic institutions, Uganda displays more 
of the characteristic challenges faced by other African countries, such as a history of conflict, 
bad neighbours and weaker institutions of good governance. These case studies thus seek to 
examine how aligned Ghana’s and Uganda’s current policies are respectively, with the 
recommendations made in the most recent literature, and where gaps exist in their 
12 | P a g e  
 
institutional, legislative and regulatory frameworks, so as to draw lessons for natural resource 
governance in Africa.  
 
Rationale 
This research is valuable as it speaks to a number of important and emerging research and 
policy paradigms, including the areas of natural resource governance and good governance, 
as well as the areas of donor and aid engagement on the African continent. The findings of 
this research have important implications for policymakers, as it will assist them with the 
effective management and utilization of the continent’s resource abundance. Thus, a greater 
understanding of the limitations of the traditional theories of natural resource governance, 
and the policy prescriptions emanating from the emerging literature on the extraction and 
production of oil, will better enable the conceptualisation of sound and effective oil 
governance in the African context. Following an analysis and critique of the available 
resource governance literature – especially in relation to the African continent, as well as the 
two case studies - the author hopes to be able to contribute to the growing literature on 
natural resource governance in general and to research on oil governance in particular. This 
research has both scholarly and practical/policy implications; it will add to the existing 
knowledge in the fields of natural resource governance, good governance and donor 
engagement, while also being of practical relevance to practitioners and policymakers.  
Further, although some literature has previously focused on Africa, these analyses have 
tended to focus on countries which discovered oil during undemocratic or authoritarian 
regimes. Little analysis exists of countries which have recently discovered oil and which have 
a moderate level of existing democracy and good governance structures. Thus, while several 
countries across Africa have recently discovered oil, the cases of Ghana and Uganda were 
chosen as Ghana displays a strong democracy and levels of good governance, whereas 
Uganda exhibits most of the characteristic challenges which face countries in Africa across 
the board. While it would be speculative to say whether Ghana or Uganda will succumb to, or 
avoid the detrimental effects of the natural resource curse, this research will provide good 
groundwork for future studies into this area. While this is not a comparative case study, two 
countries were chosen to ensure that this research is more representative and to avoid 
speculation arising. 
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Aims and objectives 
Following the seminal study done by Sachs and Warner,10 the paradoxically negative 
relationship that has been found to exist between natural resource abundance and economic 
growth, has been widely studied, and is now commonly known as ‘the natural resource 
curse’. While traditional theories have offered valuable insight into understanding the general 
causes of this phenomenon, they have tended to focus too narrowly on economic and Political 
Economy related variables as causal mechanisms. The resulting policy prescriptions have 
thus been insufficient to address the more complex and unique challenges faced by African 
states. As such, it becomes apparent that contemporary theories which offer a more holistic 
perspective on natural resource governance in Africa need to be interrogated and used in 
investigating how countries, like Ghana and Uganda, that are newly resource abundant, are 
positioned to achieve effective natural resource governance. Thus the aim of this study is to 
draw on the growing literature on natural resource governance in order to make a fresh and 
original contribution in relation to the African continent. This research aims to enrich the 
body of literature by providing a new analysis on the African continent of two countries 
which are democratic and fairly stable, which also have existing good governance 
mechanisms in place. Thus by exploring the current good governance mechanisms in Ghana 
and Uganda, this research aims to enrich the analysis and interpretation of the resource curse 
theories within the context of Africa’s new oil economies and emerging democracies.  
 
Research questions 
This research aims to explore a number of questions. The most important of these relates to 
the alternate views and policy prescriptions offered by the emerging theories of natural 
resource governance in Africa. It is hoped that several new policy options would become 
clear from this contemporary literature and that these will offer emerging oil-rich states with 
greater tools with which to bolster their oil governance architectures. 
 
Primary research question: 
 How do the emerging theories of natural resource governance in Africa differ from 
the traditional theories and what specific policy prescriptions do they entail? 
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To answer this question I intend to examine the following areas: 
- The theories proposed in the traditional natural resource governance literature and the 
resulting policy prescriptions. 
- The record of success for these traditional policies in general, and in Africa 
specifically. 
- The main challenges faced by African countries in natural resource governance, 
especially the governance of oil. 
- What changing prescriptions are given by the emerging literature? 
Secondary research questions: 
 How do the current legal and regulatory frameworks in Ghana and Uganda weigh up 
against the prescriptions of the emerging theories on natural resource governance? 
 What is the current level of governance and democratic institutions in Ghana and 
Uganda, and how can this be made to align more with the prescriptions of the 
emerging theories? 
Method 
This research falls within the tradition of qualitative research design. It seeks to examine and 
review the literature of natural resource governance, especially as it pertains to the African 
continent. It also involves two case studies to add practical application to the research, 
examining the current processes and levels of oil governance in Ghana and Uganda. It would 
be speculative to analyse whether they will or will not avoid the resource curse so early on in 
the discovery of oil in both these countries. Rather, this study examines the current policies 
and regulations in place in Uganda, against the current literature to examine where gaps exist 
according to the prescriptions of the literature.  
Two different methods of data collection were used during this study. First, secondary data 
analysis was conducted of the scholarly articles available, covering the subject of natural 
resource governance. Secondly, primary and secondary data were examined, such as 
government policy documents, regulatory framework documentation, scholarly articles, 
newspaper articles, statistical data and indices in order to conduct the two independent case 
studies. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
he paradox of natural resource governance is that despite most logical assumptions, 
resource abundance does not directly correlate with economic growth or social 
development. Rather, several empirical studies and cross-country regression 
analyses have discovered robust evidence to support the theory of the ‘resource curse’.11 One 
of the foremost studies in this regard was that of Sachs and Warner in 199512, which showed 
evidence of a negative relationship between natural resource intensity and economic growth. 
In the years that have followed, a vast selection of theoretical studies has arisen, analysing 
various aspects and causal mechanisms of the resource curse. Several studies have also found 
differing results to Sachs and Warner’s original study. While Sachs and Warner followed a 
strictly economic analysis, looking at economic growth as the single determinant of welfare, 
others have questioned whether this is the most appropriate indicator. Researchers have thus 
turned their focus to other causal mechanisms of the resource curse, including Political 
Economy explanations, focusing on patronage and rent-seeking, as well as societal 
explanations, focusing on the role of institutions and the impact of resource abundance on 
democracy. However, there is still a gap in the literature, especially pertaining to studies on 
the African continent. While a shift in the literature on natural resource governance is 
emerging, few studies on the African continent can be seen to reflect this shift entirely. 
Rather, what can be seen is that studies still remain narrowly focused on issues of the 
resource curse and rarely do these studies deviate from this line of thought. Where studies 
exist that do examine countries from a more nuanced perspective, they focus only on one 
aspect of the emerging literature and do not provide a holistic perspective on natural resource 
governance. It is this gap in the literature which this study seeks to address. 
 
Review of Literature on Ghana and Uganda 
More studies have been conducted on Ghana than on Uganda, possibly because Ghana’s oil 
discoveries were preceded those of Uganda. Examining the existing literature on Ghana, it 
becomes clear that the abovementioned gap is present. While there are very few studies 
which have currently been conducted on natural resource governance in Ghana - those that 
T 
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have focus on the natural resource curse. Duong et al13 focus purely at an economic level in 
their study of oil abundance in Ghana. Thus they examine the fiscal and monetary 
implications of oil abundance in Ghana, especially the risk of macroeconomic volatility and 
destabilisation. Similarly, Adu14 uses econometric modelling to examine the prevalence of 
the natural resource curse in Ghana. Aydin15 writing for the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) also examines the risk of the resource curse in Ghana, again focusing on statistical 
analyses to examine economic growth in the country and the possible effects of the resource 
curse. Finally, Kapela16 examined the role of private domestic ownership as a mitigating 
mechanism of the resource curse in Ghana. These studies show that there is a general lack of 
literature examining natural resource governance in Ghana, fundamentally due to the 
backward-looking nature of the natural resource curse literature. More than this shows that 
studies in this field are still dominated in orientation towards the issue of the natural resource 
curse as the only prism through which to examine natural resource abundance in African 
countries. There are also several studies focusing on Ghana which take a more nuanced 
approach to natural resource governance. However, while this is a positive step, these studies 
still tend to only examine one factor in the country and thus do not provide a holistic analysis 
of natural resource governance in the country. For example, Tsekpo and Hudson, as well as 
Myers and Mohammed17 all examine the role of Parliament in Ghana as a mechanism 
through which to strengthen accountability and good governance, to increase the governance 
structures of the petroleum sector in the country. Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, and Crawford,18 
examine the role of democracy in the governance of natural resources, as well as how 
democracy can be strengthened in Ghana. There are also several civil society organisations 
which have examined institutional factor in Ghana and their role in the governance of the 
petroleum sector.19 All these studies contribute to a more nuanced analysis; however none of 
them combine the entirety of the emerging policy prescriptions in their analysis of natural 
resource governance in Africa. It is this gap which this study aims to fill.  
Very little has been written about Uganda at this stage. However, those studies that do exist 
focus away from the natural resource curse towards more institutional, governance related 
issues; again however, none of these studies combine all the elements of the emerging 
literature. For example, Gelb and Majerowicz20 examine alternative uses for oil rents in 
Uganda, specifically through institutional development and cash transfers to the citizenry. 
Zomer and Veit21 examine the role of the United States (U.S.) new Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulations on oil governance in Uganda, and in Africa as a whole. 
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Further, civil society organisations like Revenue Watch and Transparency International have 
examined the role of increased transparency and legislation over the sector in increasing 
effective governance over the countries oil reserves.22 Importantly, many of these studies are 
forward-looking in nature, examining the current situation in the country and making policy 
recommendations for the future. It is indeed in this line with this nature of thinking that this 
study examines the case studies of Ghana and Uganda. However, where the existing literature 
has focused on either the natural resource curse or on one element of the emerging 
institutional mechanisms for natural resource governance, this study will aim to combine the 
literary prescriptions in a forward-looking analysis of both countries.  
The aim of this study is thus to examine the various caveats of the extensive literature 
surrounding natural resource governance, with the focus being placed on the governance of 
oil as a specific natural resource and to draw conclusions for natural resource governance in 
Africa. Importantly, a broad understanding of some of the more general theoretical 
frameworks underpinning this study is crucial in providing the context thereof.  
Theories of ‘Good Governance’ 
While a rich body of literature exists examining the theory of ‘Good Governance’, it is not 
within the scope of this study to undertake an in-depth analysis thereof. However, a brief 
understanding of the core elements of this concept is useful in relation to this study. 
According to the Institute of Governance in Ottawa, “Governance comprises the institutions, 
processes and conventions in a society which determine how power is exercised, how 
important decisions affecting society are made and how various interests are accorded a place 
in such decisions.”23 Then, accordingly to the Commission on Global Governance, 
“Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, 
manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse 
interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal 
institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements 
that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.”24 ‘Good 
governance’ is measured by not only economic indicators, but also political and 
administrative indicators. Higher levels of good governance are typically linked to a stronger 
rule of law, low levels of corruption, high levels of transparency, and thus generally better 
levels of institutional capacity.   
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The characteristics of oil as a natural resource 
There is now much agreement within the theory of natural resource governance that not all 
resources result in rents that have the same detrimental effects on economic growth, and that 
similarly, not all natural resources create detrimental rents. This is succinctly stated by 
Kolstad and Wiig (2009): 
while rents from certain natural resources are key to the problems faced by countries suffering a 
negative impact of resources, not all rents create similar problems, nor do all countries that have 
resources experience a negative impact of them.25  
Though rents and resources can mostly be spoken of in very general terms, in order to grasp 
the full picture of the resource curse, a more nuanced understanding of these concepts is an 
imperative. Auty (2001), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), and Isham et al. (2003) all 
make the distinction between so-called ‘point source’ resources and diffuse resources.26 Point 
source resources are those natural resources which are found in a specific geographical area, 
whereas diffuse resources are not geographically confined. One of the most prevalent point 
source resources in Africa is oil, and it is this resource which will receive specific attention in 
this study. Due to the narrow geographical extraction area that is characteristic of point 
source resources, like oil, such resources are easily controlled and protected by governments. 
Empirical research has led some to argue that it is those countries which are abundant in point 
source resources which suffer most severely from the resource curse, and that the resource 
curse is thus conditional on the type of resources found in a country.27 There are also several 
more specific aspects related to the governance of these resources which are important to 
understand. Resources of this nature characteristically produce high rents, as the costs 
involved in extraction and production are less than the market price of these commodities.  
Further, within point source resources, two categories can be determined, that is, durable and 
non-durable resources. Durable resources, like oil and gas, rely on existing reserves to 
determine their price, whereas the price of non-durable resources like gold and diamonds is 
largely reliant on the availability of such resources on the market.28    
There are also specific features related to each resource. For example, diamonds have an 
extremely high market value and are very easy to transport, leading to serious issues over 
their smuggling and the conflict that can be caused as a result, such as those witnessed in the 
DRC. In contrast, oil has its own very unique characteristics. The processes involved in the 
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identification of extractable reserves of oil, followed by its refining and transportation, all 
require very sophisticated, highly specialised technologies, and associated high levels of 
investment. While in the case of diamonds, conflicts mostly occur as a result of smuggling 
activities, with oil, conflicts mainly result from disputes over the oil fields; from societal 
grievances caused by the impacts of extraction; and from disputes over more equitable 
distribution of the revenues received. For example, in Sierra Leone, diamonds funded the 
rebel group the Revolutionary United Front and fuelled the civil war which ravaged the 
country for over a decade.29 In the Niger Delta region, oil has been the cause of societal 
grievances and violent conflict for several years.30 These characteristics are important to bear 
in mind when examining case studies on the impact of resource abundance, as each resource 
will have its own specific societal ramifications, and each will thus require specialised 
regulation and government control.31  
 
The emergence of natural resource governance theories 
While the specific literature examining the resource curse only started to emerge in the 
1970s, from as early on as the 1950s, development theorists were discussing variations of this 
question, such as the debates over dependency theories, the New International Economic 
Order, and structuralist theories. At the start of the 1950s, development theorists such as 
Arthur Lewis32 argued that the abundance of resources would aid in the development of Third 
World states. This thought was grounded in the economic theory of factors of production, 
basically relating Third World states’ lack of economic development to an imbalance in the 
factors of production. It was thus proposed that an abundance of natural resources would 
enable states to overcome such imbalances. However, scholars from the structuralist school 
of thought, such as Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer,33 objected to these theories based on a 
terms of trade argument. They claimed that countries specialising in primary commodity 
exports would succumb to declining terms of trade and the result would be a widening of the 
gap between them and the rich industrialising countries of the First World. They also pointed 
to the fact that international commodity markets often witnessed sharp fluctuations in prices, 
making primary commodity exporting countries more susceptible to external shocks. Finally, 
they argued that by specialising in primary commodities such as natural resources, countries 
were unlikely to see growth in other domestic economic sectors.34  
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Since the 1950s, many theorists have sought to empirically test these, and new, theories 
around the resource curse, with a vast amount of literature emerging from both economists 
and political scientists. Significantly, much of this literature appears to be converging. In 
order to make sense of the vast empirical data available, this study will analyse the literature 
in two sections. The first section will examine the pure economic models explaining the 
resource curse. The second section will analyse the political economic theories available on 
the subject, including those that examine the institutional explanations of this phenomenon. 
Following on from these literary analysis sections, this study will examine Ghana and 
Uganda as two case studies. To this end it is important to acknowledge that not all oil rich 
countries have been negatively affected by their resource wealth. 
 
Best practice: the Norwegian model 
Norway is hailed as one of the best models of natural resource governance in the world. 
While several elements of the Norwegian management model can be seen as important, such 
as its step-by-step approach to passing legislation; the use of its industrial taxation system 
rather than Production Sharing Agreements; and the development of a petroleum fund to 
buffer against market volatility, it was crucially the institutional context which made 
Norway’s avoidance of the resource curse possible. When Norway discovered oil it had a 
strong democratic government and a system of good governance mechanisms in place, as 
well as a strong economy, with an internationally trusted fiscal system35. Further, the 
Norwegian government enacted focussed and effective public policy of a broad and detailed 
nature, with much emphasis being placed on resource allocation measures. These policies 
included a Factor Movement Policy which created a centralised fixed-wage system; a 
Spending Effect Policy; a Spillover-Loss Policy; an Education, Research and Development 
Policy; an Active Countercyclical Policy; several Labour Market Policies; and an Industrial 
Policy36.   
One of Norway’s greatest successes was the implementation of an effective petroleum fund. 
Timor-Leste adopted this approach, and with the help of Norway established a petroleum 
fund in 2005. Through the saving of revenues, a careful investment strategy and strict 
management of withdrawals, the fund has assisted the economy of Timor-Leste. Nonetheless, 
it is important to note that a petroleum fund alone cannot replace solid fiscal management 
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frameworks or sound mechanisms of good governance in a country. In this regard, Timor-
Leste is now ranked third in terms of transparency and governance related to oil revenue 
management.37 
However, this institutional context is largely absent in Africa. While recent oil discoveries 
have been made in now democratic African states, there is a need for democratic 
consolidation within these states. Further, mechanisms of good governance are mostly not 
well established in Africa and the fiscal systems within these countries are often very poor. 
Thus, while the Norwegian expertise have been sought by several African states to assist with 
their legal and regulatory frameworks, it is crucial that the institutional context within these 
states receives attention. This is one of the main policy prescriptions emanating from the 
emerging literature of natural resource governance, which will be explored later in this study.       
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Chapter 3: Traditional Theories of Natural 
Resource Governance 
 
he traditional theories of natural resource governance originally focused on purely 
economic causal mechanisms to identify the causality between the negative 
economic growth and natural resource abundance. Following this, other traditional 
theorists broadened the scope of this causal analysis to examine the role of Political Economy 
variables in perpetuating the natural resource curse. A thorough understanding of these 
theories is important in order to grasp the context out of which the emerging theories of 
natural resource governance have emerged. While these traditional theories do hold relevance 
in explaining elements of the natural resource curse, their policy prescriptions have been 
found to either be inadequate for the challenges to governance on the African continent, or 
have been disproved by subsequent research. Further, although some analysis has been done 
from a traditional theory perspective on the African continent, these studies were of countries 
that discovered oil during an undemocratic regime. There is thus a gap in terms of research 
on upcoming, democratic, resource rich states in Africa.   
 
Economic Theories of Natural Resource Governance 
One of the first primarily economic theories on the resource curse (following on from the 
structuralist theories of the 1950s mentioned in the previous chapter) posited a link between 
the declining terms of trade for primary commodities and the negative economic growth 
experienced in primary exporting countries. Traditional terms of trade theories suggest that 
with time, the price of primary commodities such as copper will decrease in relation to 
manufactured goods, thus having a detrimental effect on countries specialising in primary 
commodity exports.38 Substantial analysis of this theory has resulted in mixed evidence, both 
for and against this theory. Some have argued that the decline in prices between primary and 
manufactured goods is in fact a reflection of an increase in the quality of those manufactured 
goods.39 This bias is, however, very difficult to remove and therefore to account for in time-
T 
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series data analyses. Another important aspect of the data which has to be considered, is the 
relevance of declining terms of trade for developing countries. While the economic rents 
created from mining may decline with time, the empirical analyses testing this theory do not 
account for the fact that mining costs may also fall during the period of analysis. Thus, if a 
country’s mining costs decline at a faster rate than the primary commodity price, the overall 
effect for the country may still be positive, despite the downward price trend. Thus, extensive 
empirical evidence has appeared in recent years discrediting the theory of declining terms of 
trade – providing evidence for no causal relationship between terms of trade and the 
economic growth of primary commodity exporting countries.40  
A second set of theories emanating out of the economic literature, also relating back to the 
original work of Prebisch and Singer, are those linking the poor economic growth of primary 
exporting countries to the role of volatile markets. It is widely known that the international 
markets for primary commodities are extremely susceptible to external shocks and are 
notoriously unstable. Specifically related to mineral commodities, market volatility is a result 
of changes in demand during the business cycle.41 This instability results in difficulties for 
developing countries, as they cannot rely on mineral revenues, thus having a negative impact 
on economic planning and therefore on economic development. While there is little 
disagreement over the fact that markets are volatile, and that those countries who have 
primary export-led economies are thus highly susceptible to external shocks, there is 
disagreement whether such volatility is detrimental to economic development. Davis and 
Tilton (2005) explain that volatility, while preventing government planning can sometimes 
induce needed changes in government policy or programmes which would otherwise not have 
occurred. Further, they highlight that market challenges can induce the development of more 
efficient mining production methods. Finally, they also draw on the experiences of countries 
such as Norway and Ghana in the employment of stabilisation funds to protect against 
external shocks. Thus, the conclusion drawn by the authors, and backed empirically by the 
work of Sachs and Warner, is that there is no correlation between volatile mineral markets 
and poor economic growth.42 An analysis of theories on volatile markets yielded little in 
terms of policy prescriptions for country’s to avoid these effects. Rather the use of 
stabilisation funds has emerged more recently, largely as a result of emerging theoretical 
prescriptions. 
The third set of economic theories, are those which refer to what is commonly known as the 
Dutch Disease. These emerged following the experience of the Dutch economy during the 
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gas boom of the 1960’s. It purports that if there is an increase in a commodity price (as 
occurs during a commodity boom) there will be an associated increase in the real wage rate, 
as a result of the booming industry trying to attract more labour. This in turn, causes an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Such a boom also requires the economy to restructure, 
shifting labour to the booming mineral sector, raising wages at the same time to attract this 
labour. These changes often have a detrimental effect on the traditional domestic sectors, like 
manufacturing, which suffer from decreased productivity and competitiveness. The result is 
an overall decrease in economic diversification and an increased dependence on the mineral 
markets – making the economy more susceptible to external shocks. Further, when the boom 
dries out, the country is required to return production to its traditional sectors which can be 
extremely costly for the economy; at times these sectors are completely beyond repair.43 
While this theory does appear to have some applicability and there is empirical evidence to 
support it, it has also been widely criticised for only explaining the resource curse in part. It is 
argued that the above-mentioned structural adjustments alone are not to blame for the curse; 
rather it is the additional assumptions of the Dutch Disease theory which are responsible. 
These assumptions include that the boom will eventually come to an end and thus that 
transition back to traditional sectors will be required, as well as the assumption that learning 
(which results in a decrease in production costs) accompanies the process of manufacturing 
production but not the process of mineral commodity production. However, the evidence of 
these assumptions is not robust and thus the applicability of this theory is arguably quite thin. 
Further actual evidence of these effects in natural resource abundant countries is very scarce, 
and therefore insignificant.44 Ross (1999) is also very critical of the Dutch Disease model as 
he argues that it is inadequate in relation to developing states:  
The model assumes that an economy’s capital and labour supplies are fixed and fully employed before 
a boom begins. Under these conditions, a booming resource sector should draw capital and labour away 
from agriculture and manufacturing, thus raising their production costs. Yet developing states often 
have labour surpluses, and their resource booms draw in foreign capital and labour, offsetting any local 
scarcities.45 
Thus it becomes clear that this model, while traditionally viewed as a promising explanation 
for the resource curse, in fact has been found to make questionable assumptions and 
inadequately explains the situation faced by developing states.46   
While the purely economic theories of the natural resource curse described in the above three 
paragraphs do go some way towards explaining the causal mechanisms behind the negative 
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growth experienced by resource abundant countries, each of them has debatable aspects. The 
consensus in recent times has thus been that purely economic theories alone cannot fully 
explain the curse.47 It has also been seen that these theories provide little towards policy 
prescriptions in response to their findings – especially for Africa. Therefore, many political 
scientists have turned their attention to political economy explanations to provide a more 
complete understanding. It is to these theories which this study now turns: 
 
International Political Economy Theories 
Political Economy models examine the use of rents as a causal mechanism in determining the 
potential outcomes of natural resource abundance. Kolstad and Wiig (2009),48 provide an in-
depth overview of the political economy models of the resource curse, drawing heavily on the 
similar work done by Caselli and Cunningham (2007).49 They classify the theories into two 
main groups: centralised political economy models and decentralised political economy 
models. The first group of models, “focus on the decisions of the political elite, and how 
these are affected by natural resources”,50 whereas the second group, “analyze the incentives 
of private agents and the effect of resources on their allocation of effort between activities.”51 
More generally, this first group refers to theories of patronage, and the second group to 
theories of rent-seeking. Each of these theories will thus be examined: 
Patronage occurs when public resources are employed for the appropriation of political 
power. This model focuses on the decisions of political elites who exploit their positions of 
authority for their own gain, be that self-enrichment or staying in power. Thus it analyses 
how politicians misappropriate natural resource rents in the pursuit of these goals rather than 
for the benefit of society. Robinson et al. (2006)52 show how politicians discount the future in 
terms of government planning as the future utility of their staying in power increases, 
resulting in the creation of inefficiencies within the economy. Further, these authors also 
point out that there is a link between resource rents and public employment, as politicians use 
public jobs as bargaining power for electoral support. However, the eventual effect of 
patronage on economic development within natural resource rich states is largely ambiguous, 
as both productive and unproductive methods can be used by political elites to achieve these 
goals. Not all forms of patronage are corrupt in nature, and thus not all forms of patronage 
will result in economic inefficiencies. Thus it becomes apparent that there must be some 
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underlying variable which is the determining factor in whether a country’s experience of a 
natural resource boom is positive or negative.53 
Rent-seeking, similar to patronage, is the pursuit of rents at the expense of society, often in 
the form of corruption. A negative effect on society can result when entrepreneurs use their 
skills to pursue rent-seeking activities, thus causing a decrease in production, that is, such 
activities result in a reduction of societal income. The basic problem is thus not the rents 
themselves, but rather the misappropriation of resources in the pursuit of these rents. 
Empirical evidence is provided by, amongst others Mehlum et al. (2009),54 for the important 
role that rent-seeking has in increasing the negative effects of the resource curse. While there 
is debate as to whether either patronage or rent-seeking models provide more robust 
explanations of the resource curse, according to both theories, the most essential element in 
designing policies to reduce the effect of the resource curse is to develop institutions or rules 
which decrease the incentives involved in the practices of rent-seeking and patronage.55 
While this is a useful prescription in the context of African states, it remains very vague and 
as such does not provide enough details to have much practical relevance. Nonetheless, the 
role of institutions has more and more been seen as a fundamental element in the explanation 
of the resource curse. For example, Bulte et al. (2005)56 argue that the basic model of rent-
seeking, as was discussed above, is ‘too blunt’ and thus requires additional elements to make 
it more robust. These additional elements are the governance institutions of countries. It is 
thus to a discussion of the literature around the role of institutions that this study now turns: 
Institutional explanations 
From the above discussion of the political economy models of the resource curse, it becomes 
apparent that the processes of both rent-seeking and patronage are conditional on institutions. 
Some of the initial research done by Sachs and Warner (1995)57 - to investigate the role of 
resource abundance in decreasing institutional quality, and as a result economic growth - 
found this mechanism to have no empirical importance. However, subsequent research by 
Mehlum et al.58 found contrasting evidence. They show that the differing economic growth 
records witnessed among resource abundant countries is primarily as a result of the 
distribution of resource rents through institutional arrangements. In this they distinguish 
between ‘producer friendly’ and ‘grabber friendly’ institutions, the first of which enable rent-
seeking and production to be complementary activities, whereas the latter causes them to be 
competing institutions. In this sense, grabber friendly institutions (such as a weak rule of law 
and corruption) have negative effects on economic growth. The authors provide several 
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examples to validate their findings.59 For example, Botswana is heavily endowed with 
diamonds, accounting for 40% of their GDP, yet they have experienced the highest global 
growth rate since 1965. This is attributed to the country’s high institutional quality. A further 
example, as mentioned above, is Norway. Again, the fact that Norway saw positive economic 
growth from its natural resource abundance is attributed to the country’s low levels of 
corruption and high levels of institutional quality. On the opposite end of the scale, however, 
are countries like Nigeria, Venezuela and the DRC, which are all rich in various natural 
resources, yet have suffered from negative economic growth as a result. This is attributed to 
the high levels of corruption and dysfunctional institutions present in these countries. The 
authors link their findings to those of theorists like Robinson et al. (2002), thus showing the 
empirical significance of institutions in relation to rent-seeking. Similar work was done by 
Damania and Bulte (2003)60 which shows the empirical significance of institutions in relation 
to patronage.  
A second strand of theories focusing on the role of institutions, posit that a conditional 
variable on the negative effects of natural resource abundance is governance. Some have 
referred to this as the Nigerian Disease theory61 (as a play on the traditional Dutch Disease 
hypothesis). This hypothesis argues that revenue receipts from natural resources are 
squandered by governments who lack the institutional capacity to use these economic gains 
effectively. Linked to this is the idea that mechanisms of good governance in a country 
remove the benefits associated with rent-seeking and other forms of corruption and thus 
enable economic development to occur. Robinson et al. (2006)62 discuss the role of 
misaligned political incentives in linking natural resource abundance with economic 
development. Thus, the overall argument made by this strand of theories is that countries with 
good institutions for governance are more capable of responding to the challenges associated 
with natural resource abundance. Therefore, the general conclusion is that in order to mitigate 
the resource curse, it is imperative to design institutions and regulations to decrease the 
incentives associated with the mechanisms of rent-seeking and patronage. However, these 
theories again lack clarity on actual policy responses to be used by countries.  
The link to conflict 
Several offshoot theories have emerged around the resource curse and institutions. Of 
significance, have been the many debates which have arisen around the link between resource 
abundance and conflict. Le Billon63 examines the role of competition for rents in driving war, 
whereas Collier and Hoeffler64 examine the relationship between resource abundance and 
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civil war in the context of the greed versus grievance debate. They argue that the presence of 
natural resources provides both the motivation and the means for armed conflicts. Thus they 
conclude that in resource rich countries, civil war is more likely, due to the abundance of 
resource rents. Further, this likelihood is more significant in oil-producing countries. 
However, while the work of these authors provides insight into the link between resource 
abundance and conflict, it says little about the implications that this has on the governance of 
those resources, nor of the direct policy prescriptions suggested for resource rich states. 
Following on from these institutional analyses, several studies have emerged examining the 
impact of natural resource abundance on democracy. 
The impact on democracy 
Some of the most influential work on the relationship between oil abundance and 
authoritarian rule (or a lack of democracy) has been done by Michael Ross. In one of his 
initial empirical studies, which covered a wide range of countries and regime types, he found 
that ‘oil hinders democracy’. In this he identified three causal mechanisms: the rentier effect, 
the repression effect and the modernisation effect.65 However, in one of his later studies, 
covering a wider time frame,66 he found that the statistical evidence for the ‘modernisation 
effect’ was not significant enough for it to be considered relevant. Thus this study will only 
take a brief look at his first two causal mechanisms.  
The rentier effect first emerged out of Middle Eastern scholarly work on rentier states, and 
argues that the revenues accrued by governments from oil, are used to decrease the social 
pressures which would otherwise have called for greater government accountability. Thus 
governments use resource rents to pay off citizens’ concerns - either in the form of patronage 
or lower taxes.  
The repression effect, on the other hand, refers to increased military expenditure by 
governments with oil abundance in order to increase internal security and to suppress 
democracy in society. Thus Ross finds that there is a tendency in oil-rich states towards 
authoritarianism. This element of Ross’s argument correlates effectively with the research of 
Collier and Hoeffler on civil wars, which also shows a link between resource abundance and 
increased military expenditure by governments. The findings of Ross therefore find oil 
abundance to have a statistically valid and significant negative effect on democracy. 
However, he does little to suggest policy options for countries so as to mitigate these effects. 
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Conclusion 
The above examination of the traditional theories of natural resource governance provides 
insight into the theoretical history of natural resource governance. What becomes clear from 
this analysis is that many of these theories have either since been shown to lack causality or 
lack adequate policy prescriptions for recently resource rich African states.  
Of the pure economic theories, terms of trade has since been found to have no causality in 
explaining the resource curse. Volatile markets, while similarly having been found to have no 
direct causality, are also not always as detrimental to countries as the theory claims. For 
example, Norway and Ghana introduced stabilisation funds which prevented such negative 
effects. Finally, the Dutch Disease theory argues in favour of economic diversification as a 
policy prescription for countries, which has some contemporary validity. However, this 
theory does not explain the resource curse in its entirety and while this policy prescription has 
some usefulness, alone it does not offer countries enough advice on natural resource 
governance to avoid the resource curse. Further, while it assumes that the labour force in 
countries will be fully employed before a resource boom, this is almost never the case in 
developing countries and thus this theory is inadequate for Africa. 
Of the Political Economy theories, patronage and rent-seeking alone have been found to only 
explain elements of the resource curse. While these practices do often occur in developing 
countries, these theories do not provide complete policy prescriptions for such countries. 
Both these theories would point to the development of institutions to monitor such practices, 
which is useful, but not enough. This leads to the institutional analyses of the natural resource 
curse. These analyses point to the need for strengthened mechanisms of good governance, as 
well as institutional and regulatory frameworks. This policy, of all the traditional policy 
prescriptions, is the most relevant for developing states in Africa. It is indeed this line of 
thought which has prompted many of the emerging theories and subsequent, more specific, 
policy prescriptions on natural resource governance.  
Therefore, what becomes clear, is that while the traditional theories of natural resource 
governance have explanatory value in some respects, the policy prescriptions which emanate 
from them are largely generic in nature and have increasingly been shown to lack adequacy 
for the African context. It becomes clear that while the traditional theories have focused on 
empirical explanations of the natural resource curse, the ‘how’ is still to be answered. 
Importantly, Africa is almost completely absent from the traditional theoretical studies. 
30 | P a g e  
 
Although the cases of Nigeria and Botswana are regularly cited on either side of the natural 
resource governance spectrum, in-depth analysis of African case studies are sorely lacking 
from this body of literature. This is even more so in terms of in-depth studies on democratic 
states in Africa who are resource abundant. It is largely in this vein that many of the emerging 
theories have arisen – to fill the gaps in the literature. That is, a lack of focus and applicability 
for Africa; and a lack of practical policy-driven solutions to the problems of natural resource 
governance in general. It is important to understand the development of the traditional 
theories; an understanding of the institutional analyses in particular provides insightful 
context from which the emerging theories derived. Nonetheless it is necessary in the context 
of upcoming petro-states in Africa to examine the emerging theories on natural resource 
governance – in particular their applicability for the African continent.  
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Chapter 4: Africa and the Emerging Theories of 
Natural Resource Governance 
 
 s a result of the insufficiencies of traditional theories, there is now an emerging 
body of literature examining the specific challenges of, and policy responses to, 
natural resource governance on the African continent. A large consensus has 
emerged, that while the traditional theories do hold some weight in terms of explaining the 
causes of the resource curse on the continent, African countries face several unique 
challenges, which require specific policy responses – responses which are not provided in the 
traditional literature. Most of these arguments revolve around the policy advice stemming 
from traditional theories and their lack of applicability for African cases. They focus 
predominantly on targeting poverty, governance and institutional frameworks. Importantly, 
these theorists recognise the inherent challenge of natural resources for development within 
the African continent. This focal area is where emerging theories fundamentally add value to 
the literature on natural resource governance and increase the applicability of this literature 
for Africa. 
 
Emerging Theories  
Jensen and Wantchekon (2004)67 focus specifically on the African continent. The result of 
their research shows a significant negative causal relationship between resource abundance 
and the level of democracy in Africa. More specifically, that it is the executive decision-
making surrounding resource rents which decreases the ability for the processes of 
democratic transition and consolidation to occur in states in Africa. Thus, the authors find 
that natural resource-rich countries in Africa are more likely to be authoritarian; have 
increased levels of government spending; exhibit decreased levels of governance; and are 
more likely to suffer from democratic breakdown. Further, they also show that the level of 
dependency in states to resources is negatively correlated with change in the level of 
democracy. This corroborates the work of Bratton (1998) who found that during the third 
wave of democratisation: 
A 
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There was a decline in the rate of leadership alternation (37% to 6.6%), an increase in the rate of 
opposition boycotts (11% to 73%), and an increase in the mean of winner’s vote share (61.4% to 69.1% 
for presidential elections and 62.7% to 72.0% in parliamentary elections).68 
The theoretical argument behind these findings is that: 
An abundance of natural resources increases competition for control of the state, which is linked to 
high levels of political violence and the use of resource rents by ruling parties to maintain their hold on 
political power. Resource-poor countries like Mali and Benin have less competition for control of the 
state, which favours elite co-operation and the maintenance of democratic governance.69 
Further,70 the authors argue that even in democratic states with strong political competition, 
dependency on natural resources often leads to lower levels of democracy, as the process of 
democratic consolidation is negatively affected. The reason for this is that countries, 
especially in Africa, often exhibit poor rule of law, high levels of corruption, and thus poor 
levels of good governance mechanisms in general.  
Another African study was done by Omgba,71 who examined the direct causality between oil 
revenues and the length of tenure of heads of states in Africa. While several studies have 
examined conflict relating to natural resource abundance; institutional mechanisms of 
causality; political competition for control of rents; and the effect of revenues on the type of 
political regime, and while Omgba draws on these studies, the findings of his research reveals 
new insight for African states. The author shows that there is a positive, significant 
relationship between oil revenues and the length of tenure of the executive branch of 
government. Further, Omgba shows that oil revenues have a significant effect on democracy 
and that this effect is not only present in the Middle Eastern ‘rentier states’, but also in Africa 
– through corruption within state apparatuses. Finally, Omgba’s research results show: 
That many efforts aiming at a process of democratization in Africa are likely to be unsuccessful if an 
important preliminary condition is neglected: It is essential to increase transparency in the use of oil 
revenues and to install a suitable framework that would prevent the public decision makers from 
absorbing the revenue.72  
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Here the author points to the role of multinational corporations and civil society, alluding to 
elements of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the role of civil society in increasing 
public awareness, in the appropriation of policy decisions.73  
Nicholas Shaxson (2005) focuses on the traditional theory of market volatility, but applies 
what are seen as new approaches for the African continent. The author argues that traditional 
policy prescriptions such as “the use of oil funds...oil risk markets...diversifying away from 
dependence, and avoiding pro-cyclical spending and borrowing,”74 have not been effective in 
Africa. For example, the author shows that while some of these options have been successful 
in countries like Norway, in Africa this has not been the case.  
Nigeria’s development plan of 1975, after the 1973 oil price bonanza, aimed at arrival within the 
income bracket of developed countries in two decades. But despite $350 billion in oil revenues in 35 
years (after deducting payments to foreign oil companies), the number of Nigerians living under the 
UN poverty threshold of a dollar a day has risen from 19 million in 1970 when the population was 49 
million to 90 million in 2000.75 
Thus, in showing how poor African countries’ record is in using these approaches, the author 
argues that the traditional literature overlooks oil contracts – which he believes is a viable 
policy prescription for African countries to mitigate the negative effects of market volatility. 
In explaining the effects of excess volatility, Shaxson76 explains how those most affected are 
the poor, and thus that excess volatility is detrimental to development. In line with this, the 
author also shows how oil contracts tend to make the effects of volatility more severe for the 
producer than the oil company, due to the distribution of revenues. In explaining the use of 
oil contracts, Shaxson argues that not only should issues of contract design be considered, but 
also of more intricate issues, such as “the pace of oil developments, the rate at which 
international oil companies (IOCs) recoup their investments, the appropriateness of big 
signature bonuses, and how bank loans secured against oil revenues are disbursed and then 
repaid over time.”77 Further, the author argues that this is a crucial element within the 
overarching move towards a greater understanding of the way in which oil interacts with 
African societies and economies.78  
In an extensive article, Ian Gary and Terry Karl (2003), examine the results of oil booms on 
the African continent, highlighting the challenges faced by several countries.79 While this 
report was written in 2003 and thus tends to focus more on undemocratic African countries, 
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theoretically the authors make several important claims. The first players in the resource 
policy arena which they focus on, are the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), namely 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In explaining the role of the 
World Bank the authors state that: 
The World Bank Group provides direct finance for oil projects, grants political risk insurance and other 
guarantees, and promotes changes in the policy and legal environment conducive to investment.80  
However, these institutions have notoriously neglected to stipulate minimum development, 
environment or social requirements for the countries to which they provide finance. 
Importantly, the authors also point out that these institutions play a pivotal role in influencing 
governments’ management, spending and accruement of revenues. While Gary and Karl81 
point out that some efforts have been made in recent times by the IMF and the World Bank to 
change some of their practices and standard operating procedures, mostly these have been 
surface efforts which have lacked true depth and effectiveness. The IFIs have attempted to 
increase transparency in the extractive industries both internally and in producing countries 
themselves, however, constraints still remain. These institutions still lack clear terms of 
engagement for their operations in Africa. While they have encouraged policy reform, this 
has largely been in their favour and has focused minimally on environmental and societal 
impacts. Similarly, the involvement of the World Bank has not been conditioned on levels of 
good governance and thus while a rhetoric of increased transparency is being furthered by the 
Bank, the reality on the ground remains largely unchanged. While these institutions have 
begun to focus on increasing government capacity in the countries in which they are 
involved, the outcome of this has been a strengthening of centralisation and concentration of 
power. For example, the authors illustrate this point in the case of Congo-Brazzaville: 
In Congo-Brazzaville, a World Bank-inspired oil convention clarified what had been a confusing 
relationship between the government and the national oil company, SNPC, but the reform coincided 
with President Sassou-Nguesso’s strategy of denying institutional refuge to rivals by placing SNPC 
under the President’s wing. This contradicted an IMF recommendation that SNPC be put under the 
Ministry of Finance. So tight is presidential control that the figures of the national oil company are said 
to be unknown even to the Ministry of Hydrocarbons or the Ministry of Finance, according to local 
press reports.82 
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Thus there has been a growing pressure on the World Bank to reform its policies and for this 
reason the Extractive Industries Review (EIR) was undertaken by the Bank from 2001 to 
2003. 
The IMF has a distinctly different mandate than the World Bank and thus it has engaged with 
the extractive industries (especially the oil industry) in distinctly different ways. It has 
attempted to increase transparency by publishing a “Code of Good Practices in Fiscal 
Transparency” and a “Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial 
Policies”. However, these have often tended to be more operational in nature, rather than 
being based on a principled approach.83 Two different types of special oil funds have also 
been encouraged by the IMF. The first are Future Generation Funds, which are used to invest 
an amount of current oil revenue in preparation for the future decrease in oil reserves. As was 
mentioned above, this type of fund was effectively used by Norway. However, many argue 
that such a principle is not viable in Africa, where revenue could rather help decrease 
poverty. Aside from this, such a mechanism requires sound economic management, and thus, 
as yet, has not been successful in any African states. The second are stabilisation funds, 
which are useful in the management of external price volatility. Again, while these are known 
to be effective, they have not yet had success in Africa due to the technical difficulties 
involved in managing them. Nonetheless, the IMF still encourages countries to employ such 
mechanisms despite both types of funds having a 100% failure rate in Africa.84 Thus the 
authors question the role which IFIs play in the extractive industries. While these institutions 
are important, their aims, the way they pursue their business, and their insistence on a ‘one-
size fits all’ model in Africa is often more detrimental than successful.  
Gary and Karl85 also examine the responses of corporate players to the resource curse in 
Africa. Here they identify several strategies which have been employed by companies to 
improve their practices in the extractive industries. Firstly, in order to mitigate the claims that 
their activities harm local communities, companies have sought philanthropic measures such 
as donations to good works. While at times these are well-designed and effective, at other 
times they are very poor. While such efforts create widespread media attention, and increase 
relations with the host government, in most instances they are used by companies as an 
excuse for unfair contractual agreements. A second way that companies have responded to 
such claims is by creating ‘corporate codes of conduct’. This is largely in response to the 
growing call for increased corporate social responsibility. However, despite these measures, 
oil spills continue and the benefits of oil production continue to be predominantly amassed by 
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government elites, rather than benefiting the local population. The authors conclude that what 
is needed is a fundamental shift in the policy environment and that there is a crucial role to be 
played by international financial institutions, corporate players, and civil society in this 
regard.86   
Several recent articles have also focused on the link between natural resources and poverty, 
an issue which is especially pertinent for the African continent. Michael Ross (2001), links 
extractive industries with poverty by examining seven variables identified in the ‘World 
Development Report 2000-2001’; that is, the rate of economic growth – as this has the most 
impact on the poor, and resources tend to decrease economic growth; the type of economic 
growth – focusing on non-extractive and ‘downstream’ industries to avoid the Dutch Disease; 
child welfare – ensuring that revenues are allocated to health care; income inequality; 
vulnerability to economic shocks; government accountability and responsiveness – improving 
the mechanisms of good governance; and civil war. The author argues that in order to 
alleviate the detrimental effects of extractive industries on poverty in Africa, exports need to 
be diversified and transparency promoted; there needs to be more monitoring and control of 
the revenues; and aid should be conditional on democracy and pro-poor policies.87  
Then, within the broader framework of the ‘good governance’ literature, several recent 
articles have focused on the importance of bolstering the levels of good governance in 
African countries as a means of addressing the challenges of resource governance. In an 
article in 2001, Ambassador Daniel António explained how a culture of peace, good 
governance and people-centred development is crucial if Africa is to overcome the many 
challenges resulting from its colonial past, which is fundamentally related to the emerging 
ideas surrounding resource governance in Africa.88 This move towards increased good 
governance is intrinsically linked to the emerging literature regarding transparency and 
accountability, as well as corporate responsibility in the extractive industries.89 Following on 
from this, insightful work has recently been done by Williams (2011),90 focusing on how to 
create an actual policy response at an institutional level. He argues that the general agreement 
within the field is that transparency is a crucial element in preventing the resource curse. The 
author highlights that there are several ways through which a lack of transparency can 
negatively affect resource abundant states: 
This lack of transparency can: (i) make corruption more attractive, in that it can reduce the probability 
of discovery; (ii) make it easier to capture rents; (iii) create principle-agent problems... and (iv) can 
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undermine democracy via these resource rents by reducing the need for domestic taxation, (and hence 
reducing demands for accountability), increasing spending on patronage, and/or increasing spending on 
the direct oppression of dissenting voices.91 
Here it is noted that several policy initiatives already exist, such as the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) and ‘Publish What You Pay’ (PWYP) initiative. However, as 
pointed out by Williams, the empirical relationship between natural resources, transparency 
and economic growth has never solidly been established in the literature, and thus this is his 
aim. His empirical findings show that first, resource abundant countries are less transparent, 
especially when they are rich in point source resources. Second, this lack of transparency is 
almost directly as a result of resource rents; and third, the role of transparency is significant 
in explaining the negative relationship between natural resource abundance and economic 
growth. However, this transparency arises from point source resource export revenues rather 
than from resources revenues per se. 
Other recent literature has similarly taken a more policy-oriented approach. Al-Kasim et al. 
(2008), focus on grand corruption in the regulation of the oil industry. The authors investigate 
the reasons for the distorting effect of corruption on the regulation of oil, providing policy 
recommendations for decreased corruption; increased and more effective regulation; greater 
government capacity; more accountable institutions; as well as the role of transparency 
initiatives, aid, and corporate social responsibility.92 The authors thus draw attention to the 
role of regulatory frameworks to: 
Determine the revenues and responsibilities for actors involved in the industry, including the private 
sector and the government. By defining certain requirements regarding exploration, field development 
activities, technologies applied, the number of operators, the role of NOCs (National Oil Companies), 
and monitoring opportunities, this framework sets the scene for the industry’s activities. Regulation 
determines the opportunities for the sector to function efficiently, and whether this works for the 
benefit of society at large.93 
However, the optimal functioning of the oil industry is not only determined by the country’s 
regulatory framework, but by its efficiency – which in turn is affected by availability of 
human resources, competencies, and levels of corruption. Corruption is the most harmful of 
these factors as it results in the sub-optimal functioning of the oil industry. Indirectly, 
corruption also distorts the political and social fibres of society. However, due to the nature 
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of the oil industry, corruption is very hard to identify and thus to prevent. Despite this and 
other factors which make identifying the true levels of corruption in society difficult, the 
authors argue that corruption is a key factor in explaining the resource curse.94 Corruption 
can occur at several points in the processes of exploration and production, thus effective 
regulation becomes essential within the oil industry. In this regard, Al-Kasim et al.95, discuss 
workable solutions for the oil industry: 
An analysis of the broader context of the political economy in a country is needed to explain grand 
corruption in the oil industry. This includes an understanding of the accountability and competence of 
political leaderships or power structures, democratisation processes, constitutional conditions, the role 
of the judiciary, the space for political opposition and free speech, and the quality of the media.96    
Thus, to increase the efficiency of regulation, governments need to focus on the procedures 
for regulation, ensuring that a level of legislation exists to provide a framework for 
exploration and production. Public access to information is also of crucial importance, as is 
overall transparency, in decreasing the likelihood of corruption. Governments need to 
increase the accountability of their institutions and decrease the benefits associated with 
corruption. In this way, the authors provide a very practical policy perspective on oil 
governance.  
There is also emerging literature focusing on donor engagement in resource rich African 
countries.97 These emerging theorists argue that donor countries have a much more proactive 
role to play in oil producing states in helping them to navigate the complexities of natural 
resource extraction, and in assisting them in bolstering their legal and regulatory frameworks.   
A final, but very important, group of emerging literature focuses on the role of conflict in 
resource rich countries. Ross (2004) discusses the distributional conflicts that most 
commonly arise from the uneven distribution of resource rents in society. Here the author 
identifies six structural risk factors for conflict in mineral exporting states, arguing that 
despite exhibiting risk factors, governments and corporate players can reduce the risk of 
conflict through the promotion of transparency, multi-stakeholder dialogue, increased human 
rights, and security issues.98  
Paul Collier99, in his book The Bottom Billion, identifies what he calls the ‘conflict trap’ and 
the ‘natural resource trap’ – which are shown to be intrinsically linked.  Collier examines the 
relationship between conflict, natural resources and poverty in order to show the reasons 
39 | P a g e  
 
behind the prevalence of conflict in Africa. He argues that both natural resources and conflict 
are development traps from which African countries struggle to emerge. An important 
empirical finding made by Collier is that countries which have previously had a civil war are 
50 per cent more likely to relapse back into war;100 and this is even more likely in the 
presence of natural resource abundance.     
Similar to the findings of Collier, several studies have found that there are strong linkages 
between poverty and inequality to violence in resource rich settings. Obi101 argues that 
natural resource wealth is often paradoxically present in many poor and underdeveloped 
countries, such as Equatorial Guinea. Clover102 also investigates this relationship, and states 
that “the strong correlation between conflict and poverty includes issues such as deep 
inequality (one of the foremost causes of violent conflict) expressed in terms of both growth 
and the distribution of resources”. It has also been found that the location of extractive 
industries in the country’s peripheral regions, as opposed to being in close proximity to the 
capital, increases the chance of separatist movements and dissenting groups, as was seen in 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria103.   
There is also a critical role to be played by political institutions in the emergence of violence 
in resource rich countries. There is a host of literature104 illustrating the role that functional 
and strong democratic institutions have to play in avoiding violence and conflict in contexts 
of resource abundance. In functioning democracies, more channels exist for dissatisfied 
groups to air their views and seek change in a peaceful manner. Conversely, where 
governments have failed to implement policies and legislation, and to sustain good 
governance and institutions that would allow for growth and development and the avoidance 
of primary resource dependency, conflict is more likely to occur.  
Roderick105 goes further to analyse the role of weak conflict management institutions in 
society, as well as high income inequality in fuelling violence. From his analysis it becomes 
highly apparent that institutions play a fundamental role in enabling countries to manage the 
windfall gains associated with a resource boom efficiently. Critically, countries need to create 
and bolster those institutions which play a governing role in the allocation of public 
resources, as well as those which hold political elites accountable for their use of resource 
rents. In this regard it becomes clear that no single policy or institution is enough, but rather a 
range of institutions is required to curb the resource curse.106 
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Finally it is important to note the incredibly complex nature of conflict on the African 
continent. While the role of governments’ internal policies and legal and regulatory 
frameworks are fundamentally linked to conflict in relation to natural resources, there are also 
external forces at work. There are various external interests and forces which play an 
important and often fundamental role in sustaining conflict in Africa. These forces should not 
be ignored in the analysis of African development and conflict.  
 
Conclusion 
What emerges from the foregoing analysis is the picture of a more policy-oriented approach 
to theory in the realm of natural resource governance. Many of the inadequacies of the 
traditional theories, especially relating to countries on the African continent, are thus tackled 
by these emerging theorists. These theorists also take a more holistic approach to natural 
resource governance, and while at times they draw on the traditional theories, they go beyond 
this to fill the gaps and to enrich the field by elaborating on the practical policy requirements 
for countries in Africa. While this move within the theoretical field of natural resource 
governance is still in its beginning phases, enough literature has already been produced to 
provide a more nuanced perspective on this field of study.  
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Chapter 5: Case Studies: Ghana and Uganda – 
upcoming democratic Petro-States in Africa 
 
his section will present two separate independent case studies of Ghana and Uganda 
respectively. The aim of these case studies is to map the current institutional, 
regulatory and legal frameworks present in each country. These will then be 
compared back to the theories of natural resource governance in terms of international best 
practice and variations therefrom, so as to assess where each country stands in relation to 
theory and to identify warning signs that exist for the future of natural resource governance in 
both countries. As an introductory note, it is important to set out three key theoretical 
concepts which relate to both case studies.  
The first is the importance of petroleum sector governance. It is crucial that a thorough 
understanding exists of the value of good governance over the petroleum sector. Failures in 
governance over this sector can have far-reaching societal, economic, political and 
developmental repercussions.107 Similarly, a country is most likely to increase development 
and translate oil revenues into tangible societal gains if there is good governance over the 
petroleum sector and if this is understood, and practiced, by all of the stakeholders involved:  
Petroleum sector governance refers to the system of making and implementing decisions concerning 
the exploitation of a nation’s oil and gas resources. It includes the policies and objectives for the sector, 
the processes of decision-making and communication, the structural and hierarchical organisation of 
the sector and the regulation of activity.108 
Importantly the true nature of the resource base needs to be understood in order to appreciate 
the role of the sector in national development.  
In this regard it is important that countries have a solid macroeconomic policy framework in 
place in order to manage revenues, enable macroeconomic stability, encourage investment 
and thus generate lasting income for the country.109 There is, however, no ideal model in this 
regard, although two dominant fiscal regimes can be identified. The first regime relies on 
taxes and royalties, while the second is based on a system of production sharing. Further from 
T 
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this, it is important for countries to have a clear and precise legislative framework to manage 
the petroleum sector. Such a legal framework should enable public investment to be aligned 
with the overall macroeconomic framework of the country.110 These country-specific 
frameworks will be examined in each case study.   
The second important theoretical concept is that of parliamentary oversight. Parliamentary 
oversight is a crucial element of good governance and is an important mechanism through 
which natural resources are governed. Indeed oversight, which is the monitoring of the 
activities of the executive for the purpose of accountability, is one of the three primary 
functions of a parliament.111 The other two functions are legislation – the passing of laws 
which constitute a country’s legal framework – and representation – being the voice of the 
citizens in the political process.112 Further, the link between good governance in respect to a 
state being capable, accountable and responsive, and parliaments, is intrinsically seen in the 
table below: 
 
Effective governance  Parliamentary roles  
State capability  Legislation  
Accountability  Oversight  
Responsiveness  Representation  
Table 1: Governance and Parliaments - Elements and Roles113 
 
Thus parliaments can play a significant role in the delivery of good governance. Indeed, a 
strong and independent Parliament can prevent against patronage networks in the governance 
of resources as it is able to monitor the activities of the executive and provide accountability 
on behalf of the general citizenry.114 
A final important theoretical concept is transparency. From the literature115 it becomes clear 
that transparency is inherently linked to most aspects of natural resource governance, and a 
lack of transparency can undermine the most well-thought out policy prescriptions. To this 
end, several international initiatives have been established to attempt to increase revenue 
transparency around the world. These initiatives have sought to increase transparency in the 
extractive industries; however, their record of success has not always been so positive. The 
pioneer transparency initiative was that of the PWYP campaign, which is a coalition 
campaigning for the mandatory disclosure of payments in the extractive industries, both by 
governments and corporations.116 Following on from the success of the PWYP campaign, the 
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EITI was established as a voluntary system for revenue payment disclosure. However, the 
voluntary nature of the EITI has been problematic and has received much corporate 
resistance, making it clear that: 
As the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is increasingly watered down, the ability of 
the EITI to deliver on the promise of increased transparency in African countries, where it is of 
especially great concern, remains seriously in doubt.117 
There appears to be a lack of international support for the EITI pilots currently underway in 
Africa. Further, due to the voluntary nature of the initiative, countries have frequently failed 
to meet the deadlines set for them in terms of increasing transparency.118 Nonetheless, by 
accepting the EITI, governments provide a good signal for the future accountability of 
revenue payments and indicate a willingness to increase transparency in the petroleum sector.  
At the level of revenue transparency, a recent development can be seen as a very positive step 
in terms of regulating corporate revenue payments and receipts. In 2010, the US Dodd-Frank 
Act was passed. Under the ‘Lugar-Cardin’ Provision, all US-listed or registered extractive 
industry companies are required to disclose all payments made to governments.119 This is an 
important regulatory development. While this only pertains to United States companies, 
recent G-8 communiqué’s and European Union legislative proposals indicate that such 
standards could be implemented more broadly among western states.120  
 
Case Study 1: Ghana 
The post-independence history of Ghana has been, in many ways, stereotypical of the classic 
African story. Ghana became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to gain political 
independence in 1957. The country, however, underwent long periods of military rule with 
only three periods of civilian government, none of which lasted more than three years before 
being overthrown in a coup d’état. However, in 1992 a liberal constitution was finally 
adopted in Ghana, and multiparty democracy began in 1993 with the start of Ghana’s Fourth 
Republic.121 Since then, four multiparty elections have been held, and the most recent 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2008 saw the second successful alternation of 
government in Ghana. More specifically, in 2000 Ghana saw the transfer of power from the 
National Democratic Congress (NDC) to the New Patriotic Party (NPP), while in 2008 that 
power transferred back to the NDC.122 Indeed, during the past two decades, Ghana has 
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become known as one of the few African democratic success stories, where peaceful 
government alternation is occurring, and where the democratisation process is proceeding at a 
steady and successful pace.123 Further, aside from regular multiparty elections under the 1992 
Constitution, Ghana has made significant strides towards society-wide entrenchment and 
institutionalisation of multiparty democratic governance. For instance, Ghanaians enjoy a 
broad spectrum of civil liberties and rights, and Ghanaian society has witnessed the 
emergence of a vibrant civil society and free, independent media in recent years.124 However, 
the process of democratisation is not yet complete in Ghana, and while the country stands as 
a model of successful democracy and peace on the continent, several democratic deficits 
remain. This is clear in the lack of decentralisation in Ghana. 
It highlights significant democratic deficits in decentralised government, in particular a delinkage 
between local participation and local government accountability, indicating that popular input into local 
policy-making processes has not meant greater popular control over local government.125  
 Thus in the context of newfound oil reserves, these democratic deficits, as well as the 
country’s history of military rule, may become a cause for concern if action is not taken in the 
early stages to prevent against the negative effects that can accompany natural resource 
wealth. This is imperative if true democratic consolidation is to be achieved in the future.126  
The improvement in Ghana’s democracy since 1992 can, however, be observed in several 
ways. According to Freedom House rankings127 of political rights and civil liberties, Ghana’s 
rankings rose from a score of 6 (“not free”) in 1991 to a current ranking of 1.5 (“free”) in 
2012. In line with this, in the most recent Afrobarometer survey,128 close on 80% of 
Ghanaians prefer democracy to military rule, one-party government or dictatorship, and 
further, 86% of Ghanaians view elections and the rule of law, as the best vehicles for 
selecting leaders and maintaining order in society. These statistics indicate that not only has 
democracy improved in Ghana, but so has the legitimacy of government in society. Thus the 
indication is that on a democratic level there is a strong, although not flawless, foundation for 
natural resource governance in Ghana.  
However there are other elements to the Ghanaian situation which make the picture for 
development more complicated. Ghana already has a developed natural resource industry, 
estimated to be among the top ten exporters of gold globally.129 It also has a developed 
mining sector, including diamonds, bauxite and manganese, contributing to 5% of GDP and 
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33% of the total value of Ghanaian exports130. Despite this apparent resource wealth, 30% of 
Ghanaians still live in poverty, on less than US$ 1.25 per day131. While there are several 
challenges in terms of legislation and regulation relating to its natural resource governance, 
Ghana has, up until now, avoided the natural resource curse and has largely succeeded in its 
natural resource governance. At the same time, it is important to realise that as a point source 
resource, oil presents Ghana with various new challenges and concerns which still could have 
negative consequences for the country if the petroleum sector is not adequately governed.  
While Ghana first discovered offshore oil deposits in the 1970s, production only began in the 
1990s, with the involvement of American and Dutch oil companies.132 However, these oil 
reserves were of little commercial viability. More recently, another offshore oil field – 
Jubilee Field - was discovered, with large commercial quantities being expected. Commercial 
oil began flowing at the end of 2010, contributing an estimated seven percent to Ghana’s 
growth in 2011.133 Tullow Oil, Andarko and Kosmos are the main companies interested in 
Ghana’s oil field, alongside the state-owned Ghana National Petroleum Company (GNPC), 
although several other companies also hold licences for exploration.134 However, it is 
important to realise that while the Jubilee Field in Ghana’s Tano Basin is commercially 
viable, in relation to the country’s population of 24 million, it represents only a relatively 
modest reserve. For perspective, the area of the Tano Basin is approximately the same size as 
a single Angolan deep water Block. Angola has six productive blocks of this size, and its 
population is almost half the size of Ghana’s.135 The reality of this is that while the 
expectations in Ghana are high for a booming oil sector, the reserves that have thus far been 
discovered are not enough to transform the economy and reduce poverty in any significant 
way. Nonetheless, if these reserves are well governed, they could have a positive impact on 
the development of the country.  
Thus it becomes clear that the petroleum endowments in Ghana, while commercially viable, 
are not enormous. Therefore, while the revenues to be generated will be able to contribute to 
the country’s developmental agenda, the expectations of the population need to be managed if 
conflict and violence are to be avoided in the future. Indeed, it has been noted136 that the 
revenues created are likely to drive corruption in Ghana, and could thus create conflict in the 
medium to long term. This is an important area for the government of Ghana to manage in the 
future. 
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Petroleum Sector Governance 
Ghana’s petroleum policy environment – towards economic development 
As a model of democracy in Africa, Ghana can be seen to be taking several mitigating steps 
towards avoiding the natural resource curse. Having learnt from the mistakes of other African 
states like Angola and Nigeria, Ghana is working towards developing an effective economic 
development strategy. Ghana has thus recently begun an industrial policy aimed at avoiding 
the traditional mistakes associated with resource wealth. While this policy has been 
welcomed as the most comprehensive since the time of Nkrumah, critics have argued that 
more sector specific policies are still necessary.  
There are two policy documents which provide the outline for Ghana’s new industrial policy 
entitled the ‘Ghana Industrial Policy’ and the ‘Industrial Sector Support Programme (ISSP)’. 
These documents provide a five-year industrialisation plan for the Ghanaian economy, 
including the expansion of the manufacturing sector’s productive and technological 
capacities, and the promotion of agro-based industrial development. While the discovery of 
oil and its production is an element of this policy framework, the main aim is to diversify the 
economy’s export base so as to avoid the Dutch Disease. Ghana successfully avoided this in 
its cocoa sector through the Ghana Cocoa Board which provided set prices for cocoa, and 
thus protected the economy and the exchange rate from cocoa price fluctuations. However, in 
the oil industry, prices are controlled by Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC). In 
light of this, Ghana’s new industrial policy was designed towards the creation of a strong 
internal economic policy to prevent external factors like market volatility from becoming the 
driving force of the country’s economic policy.137  
While the development of this industrial policy, especially at this early stage in the 
development of Ghana’s oil sector, is a good sign for the future and does appear as a good 
mitigating factor against the resource curse, concerns remain. Critics138 have argued that both 
policy documents do not provide adequate mechanisms to avoid capital flight or transfer 
pricing – factors which have negatively affected numerous oil exporting countries around the 
world. However, the significant provisions made to develop a local manufacturing base for 
Ghana’s oil industry, could prevent against some of these effects. 
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Parliamentary Oversight 
While a strong, well-designed constitution can play a significant role in increasing the 
oversight function of a country’s parliament, in practice, the provisions set out in a 
constitution may not be adhered to in the daily practicalities of Parliament. In Ghana the 1992 
constitution was uniquely designed to ensure oversight of government’s actions and to 
increase accountability within the state – two elements which have been sorely lacking in the 
past. 
In reality, Ghana’s Parliament faces several constraints in the exercise of its duties. Foremost 
is the dominance of the Executive - with the Ghanaian Parliament relying on the Executive 
for institutional resources. Further, the Ghanaian Parliament is less independent due to the 
fact that most Ministers are selected from Parliament and appointed directly by the President. 
Thus in terms of its three roles, the Ghanaian Parliament can be seen in practice to have some 
legislative impact and very little real effectiveness in terms of representation, although it does 
appear to be increasingly active and effective in terms of its oversight role.139 Indeed: 
Parliament has fairly extensive oversight powers or capacity: Government is collectively responsible to 
parliament, which, in turn, can keep government accountable through the use of committees by 
reviewing ministerial and other appointments and in questioning ministers, including the prime 
minister, in the chamber.140  
In general, the Ghanaian Parliament has, in recent years, been more proactive and effective in 
its oversight role through the use of committees which perform various functions. Indeed 
Parliament has become a trusted institution in Ghana.141  
In 2010 Parliament approved the Petroleum Revenue Management legislation.142 This is a 
good indication that the government of Ghana is making a significant effort to ensure good 
governance of its oil revenues at the macro-level; however, this is not seen at the micro level. 
Although downstream parliamentary oversight is being increased, concerted effort needs to 
be continually made at the district level if financial misappropriations are to be avoided, and 
rather that future oil revenues are allocated and utilised as planned towards economic 
development. Thus the oversight tools currently being used by Parliament will be examined 
to understand where the gaps in oversight remain.  
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 Committees 
As provided for in the constitution143, the parliamentary committee system was envisioned as 
a mechanism to enable research and investigation, as well as to allow for increased public 
participation in the legislative process. Importantly, the research of Stapenhurst and 
Pelizzo144 shows how the predominant opinion in Ghana is that committee appointments are 
not arbitrary, but rather are carefully thought through and are based on a variety of factors. 
The process of appointment is thus multi-ethnically inclusive and garners the support of the 
public. An important development in recent times has been the opening up of the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) hearing to the public and the media.145 These hearings have also 
successfully been held across the country in a variety of regions, further contributing to the 
success and effectiveness of the PAC. A good example of this can be seen in the case of the 
PAC’s first public hearing in October 2007. 146 Following a report by the Auditor General 
exposing financial discrepancies in the Ministry of Tourism accounts since 2003, the PAC 
held a hearing with the Ministry. Following the outcome of the hearing the PAC ordered the 
return of 53 million Ghana cedis and US $2,500 to the government, with the addition of 
interest on these amounts. While successful cases like this are becoming more common, the 
PAC, and other oversight committees are constrained by their lack of prosecutorial powers. 
To overcome this challenge the committees use several follow-up mechanisms, such as 
transferring their finding to the Attorney General (AG), the police, or the anticorruption 
agency for prosecution. However, the AG has been criticised for its lack of independence and 
apparent politicisation. Further, these committees have also recently engaged on a deeper 
level with policy think tanks to bolster their resources.147 
 Review of Appointments 
An important oversight role of Parliament is its review and confirmation of state 
appointments - be that chairs of state institutions, heads of independent authorities, ministers, 
deputy ministers or Supreme Court judges. However, in practice, it appears that this oversight 
tool is very ineffective in Ghana.148 This role is carried out by the Appointments Committee, 
and while it has the authority to reject a nominee’s appointment, this is rarely ever done. The 
reason appears to be that there is an understanding between Parliament and the President’s 
office, to avoid embarrassing the President through the rejection of any of his nominations, 
except in extreme cases. Thus the overall view is that the process of review of appointments 
is ceremonial and lacks depth and effectiveness.149  
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While the effectiveness and strength of Parliament’s oversight mechanism has thus increased 
significantly, there are ways in which this function could further be improved. Importantly, 
Stapenhurst and Pelizzo150 found that the level of partisanship and the effectiveness of 
committees are inversely proportional. Thus Parliament could increase the effectiveness of its 
committees by decreasing the levels of partisanship within them. Further, although 
Parliament has recently begun to engage with policy think tanks, more avid engagement on 
this level could provide Parliament with useful resources which at present are lacking. 
  
Transparency in the Petroleum Sector of Ghana 
While Ghana already has a well-developed mining sector, which as a whole contributes about 
47 % of the country’s total exports,151 Ghana’s new oil reserves could represent an important 
boom for the country’s economy. However, a key challenge is the distribution of oil revenues 
for the public good. As detailed above, Ghana’s institutional capacity is relatively strong 
compared to other resource rich countries, and thus its prospects of avoiding the resource 
curse are already significantly improved. However, revenue transparency is a crucial piece in 
the puzzle of effective oil governance.152  
 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
Ghana joined the EITI in 2003,153 indicating its desire to manage its mining sector growth in 
a transparent fashion. More recently it was indicated that the government wished to extend 
the process to its oil sector as well, and this transition is currently underway. In 2010 Ghana 
was declared EITI compliant – an accomplishment, as many African countries have failed to 
meet the grade thus far. The first EITI report examining mining revenue from January to June 
2004 was published in February 2007.154 Although the overall report appeared good, 
concerns were raised in terms of royalty computations, transparency of sub-national 
disbursements, contract transparency and the use of royalties by authorities. While 
subsequent reports have noted improvements in these areas, the most significant problem is in 
fact, the lack of efficiency in reporting on the EITI. If the EITI is to be used effectively to 
monitor transparency in Ghana’s resource sectors, especially with the imminent inclusion of 
the petroleum sector, Ghana needs to publish EITI reports in a more timely and regular 
fashion in order to enable increased transparency to become a reality. A further suggestion 
has been made that the EITI should be made mandatory by legislation in Ghana, as this 
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would decrease the challenge involved in accessing information, especially from mining 
companies and certain government departments.155  
There are three specific areas in which transparency is particularly important in the extractive 
industries sector, they are: expenditure transparency, contract transparency, and freedom of 
information. Each of these will thus be discussed in turn as they relate to Ghana. 
Expenditure Transparency 
Two legislative Acts were introduced in Ghana in recent years, both of which can be seen as 
an attempt by government to increase expenditure transparency in the country. Both Acts 
relate to public resource management and are aimed at increasing accountability, 
transparency and efficiency. The Financial Management Act of 2003 is designed to regulate 
the public sector in such a way as to ensure transparency and efficiency in the management of 
state revenues and expenditure. The Public Procurement Act of 2003 is designed to 
encourage competition and efficient, transparent and accountable procurements.156  
Along with these two pieces of legislation, there are several other efforts which show that 
Ghanaian government is committed to ensuring that high levels of expenditure transparency 
exist. Firstly, in the area of health and education, in 2007 the Public Expenditure Tracking 
Surveys (PETS) were launched. Secondly, local level royalty and related spending reports are 
included in Ghana’s EITI framework. Finally, the Ghana PWYP has been working with 
government to encourage capacity building by training local communities on how to track 
disbursements.157 However, despite these strengths, certain weaknesses remain in this area. 
While there is a solid legal and regulatory foundation in place, an area of concern is that of 
budget documentation, as well as the transparency of inter-governmental fiscal relations. 
Thus, critics have suggested that an internal audit system be established to efficiently monitor 
these areas of expenditure. Further there is also the need for increased public involvement in 
these auditing and monitoring processes.158 
In light of the Jubilee field discovery and the subsequent commercial oil production that 
began in 2010, there is a crucial need for Ghana’s strong expenditure framework to be 
transferred to the petroleum industry. Certain positive signs can already be seen in this 
regard. For instance, as explained previously, the EITI is in the process of being extended to 
include the petroleum industry. Further, after much debate, in 2011 the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act was passed to legislate the use of oil revenues, and this has added to the 
already existing Petroleum Exploration and Production Act. Included in this new legislation 
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is the creation of oil funds to cushion against market volatility and to provide savings for 
future generations. Further, the Act also includes the establishment of a Public Interest and 
Accountability Committee, which was since launched in September 2011, to bolster the 
management of petroleum revenues with additional elements of public oversight.159 
 Contract Transparency 
A common challenge in the oil and mining industries is the high levels of secrecy relating to 
contracts. This challenge is just as relevant in Ghana. The endorsement of the EITI in 2003 
has, however, made a positive contribution towards this challenge. In the first EITI report, it 
was recommended that all Ghanaian mining contracts, and investment agreements, be made 
public.160 Further, in May 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission published 
several companies’ oil contracts on their website. Following this, these contracts were also 
published on the Ghanaian Ministry of Energy website.161 While these steps are positive and 
show a level of will on the part of the Ghanaian government to tackle this area of 
transparency, challenges remain. Most crucially, no specific legislation targeting contract 
transparency exists. Thus there is no legal obligation for companies to publish their contracts. 
Further, the GNPC keeps the contracts that it enters into on behalf of the state extremely 
secret, providing no information on these. 162 Thus, unless laws are produced in the near 
future, this area of transparency will remain one of serious concern in Ghana. 
Freedom of Information 
With a score of 32.3% on the International Revenue Watch Index, Ghana is ranked as having 
scant revenue transparency.163 One of the main reasons for this incredibly low score is the 
lack of freedom of information in Ghana. While there have been strong calls made for the 
government to pass a Freedom of Information (FOI) Law, this issue remains in the realm of 
public and media debate. With the discovery of the Jubilee Field and with the launch of the 
EITI, the pressure for such a law to be created has increased. The government has submitted a 
FOI Bill to Parliament; however, it has not yet been passed, let alone debated at present. With 
the current parliamentary term ending this year, it appears doubtful that this Bill will be 
passed. This is a serious area of concern for transparency efforts in Ghana, and especially in 
light of petroleum revenue management, concerted efforts need to be made by government in 
this regard.164 
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Variations from International Best Practice 
While it appears that in many ways Ghana is making significant progress in developing sound 
resource management, several concerns remain when compared against international best 
practice. This section will seek to compare the institutional and regulatory framework in 
Ghana discussed above, with the emerging theories examined in the previous section of this 
study. 
Importantly the high levels of good governance in Ghana are a very positive sign according 
to the emerging theories of natural resource governance. For instance, this is highlighted in 
the writings of Antonio,165 and is especially witnessed in the high levels of accountability and 
transparency that are being pursued by the Ghanaian government at present. The importance 
of good governance is also identified by Jensen and Wantchekon,166 and by Ross167. In this 
regard it would appear that Ghana is making significant progress towards developing a strong 
institutional capacity which is in line with international best practice for the efficient 
management of oil. The depth of entrenchment of democracy in the country is also a very 
positive sign. Ghana’s strong liberal constitution, four successful multi-party elections and 
the successful alternation of government in 2008, are all encouraging signs that mitigate the 
findings of Omgba.168  
At an economic level there are also several encouraging signs in Ghana. Ross169 argues that 
the type of economic growth in resource rich countries is likely to become skewed and thus is 
not always beneficial to the general population. In order to mitigate this he advocates for 
export diversification and for the promotion of government transparency, as well as pro-poor 
policies within government. Ghana’s Industrial Policy and the ISSP are both constructive in 
this regard. Both policies are targeted towards export diversification and pro-poor growth and 
thus are an important step in preventing against skewed economic growth. Likewise, the 
strong regulatory framework, and supporting institutional mechanisms in Ghana are geared 
towards increased transparency of the oil industry. This, together with the considerable 
commitment made by the Ghanaian government to the EITI, as well as the fact that Ghana is 
one of the few countries on the continent that is EITI compliant, are noteworthy indicators 
that at the level of transparency, Ghana is working towards achieving international best 
practice standards.  
However, there are several areas of concern. The first is the strong executive dominance 
shown over Parliament in Ghana. Executive dominance is identified by Jensen and 
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Wantchekon170 as a warning sign for the possible decrease in the ability of the processes of 
democratic transition and consolidation in a country. Further, while Ghana has mostly very 
high levels of good governance indicators, the growing level of corruption in the country is a 
possible warning sign. This is mentioned specifically by Al-Kasim et al.171 who argue that 
despite the presence of a strong regulatory framework, corruption is the single most important 
factor in influencing the manifestation of the resource curse in a country. A final area of 
concern is that of oil contracts. These have not received enough attention by government. 
While there is some government transparency in this regard, the lack of specific legislation 
covering oil contracts is a concerning factor which is highlighted by Shaxson172 as a 
fundamental element in the increased susceptibility of countries to market volatility.  
It thus becomes clear that in many ways Ghana has made significant strides towards 
achieving the standards of international best practice in the management of the country’s 
newfound oil resources. Nonetheless, as the country begins the stage of production and thus 
as revenues begin to accrue, the warning signs highlighted above will serve to increase the 
risk of the resource curse for Ghana.   
    
Case Study 2: Uganda 
Uganda’s post-independence history has been marred by violent conflict and political 
instability. Idi Amin took power in 1971 through a military coup, and as a result of his rule, 
the country experienced economic and political instability and strife until Museveni, the 
leader of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), took power in 1986.173 Facing a vast 
array of challenges emanating from the legacy of Amin’s rule, in the first decade of power, 
the NRM largely made significant improvements to the country. At the same time, the 
northern regions of Uganda were plagued by conflict due to the presence of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA). Until 1996, Museveni, and the NRM were hailed as having 
transformed Uganda from a near failed state to one of Africa’s success stories.174 However, in 
the years since then, the government of Uganda has been classified as ‘neo-patrimonial’ by 
several observers.175 This is aptly described by Global Witness: 
This is a system of government which is dominated by an individual leader whose personal authority is 
indistinguishable from that of the state and in which political power is maintained through a 
combination of patronage and the selective use of intimidation and force.176   
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The main reasons for such a classification are threefold: First, while Uganda’s Constitution 
was changed in 2005 to introduce multi-partyism, in that same year a vote by the Parliament 
of Uganda changed the Constitution to allow for Museveni to stay in power – removing the 
two five-year presidential term limit.177 This is a warning sign for the entrenchment of 
democracy in the country. Second,178 according to Transparency International’s 2011 
Corruption Perceptions Index, (this ranks countries out of 10, with 10 being ‘very clean’ and 
0 being ‘highly corrupt’), Uganda ranked 146th in the world with a score of 2.4. Further, 
Global Integrity has stated that the gap between the existence and actual implementation of 
anti-corruption safeguards in Uganda is “one of the largest in the world”.179 Thirdly, in recent 
times, Museveni has sought to consolidate the military as an important power-base for the 
NRM, having announced in 2010 that Uganda’s Presidential Guard Brigade would be 
integrated into the army’s Special Forces unit in order to protect the country’s strategic 
assets, some of which are oil fields. Further, the leader of this unit is Lieutenant Colonel 
Muhoozi Keinerugaba, President Museveni’s son.180 These trends towards neo-patrimonial 
rule can be seen as a warning sign for the possible deterioration of democratic rule in 
Uganda. Within the context of the governance of Uganda’s oil reserves, this is a worrying 
development in the governance structures of the country. 
While the search for oil in Uganda dates back to the 1920s under British colonial rule, these 
areas could not be explored more until the 1980s due to two reasons: first the onset of World 
War I and second, the political instability of post-independence Uganda. Between 1983 and 
1992 aeromagnetic surveys conducted in the country exposed five sedimentary basins.181 The 
Albertine Graben (the area in and surrounding Lake Albert) was later proven to be the best 
suited for oil exploitation. The Graben is situated in western Uganda forming part of the East 
African Rift Valley and running along the Ugandan-Congolese border up to Uganda’s 
northern border with South Sudan.182 Several agreements for the initial exploration and 
testing of the Graben have been signed between the Ugandan government and international 
companies such as Tullow Oil. However, oil is not the only important factor in this region. 
The Albertine Rift is also one of the richest eco-systems in Africa and is comprised of several 
protected areas, including parks, forest reserves and wildlife sanctuaries.183 The estimated oil 
reserves in this region vary from source to source, mainly due to discrepancies between oil 
reserves (the actual amount of oil present) and recoverable reserves (the amount of oil that is 
commercially viable for extraction).184 Most estimates place the amount of oil reserves in the 
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Albertine Graben at 6 billion barrels of oil, with a projected production of between 100 000 
and 150 000 barrels per day.185  
Thus, while the prospect of increased government revenues and therefore improved economic 
growth and development in Uganda are possible if the oil industry is well managed, the 
detrimental economic prospects of the resource curse are not the only possible negative effect 
that oil could have. As mentioned above, the area is a vibrant eco-region and with a number 
of the protected parks being either partly or fully within the oil blocks, the possibility of 
negative environmental impacts is highly likely.186 A further point of concern, which several 
organisations have raised, is the possibility of tensions and conflict if community 
expectations are not adequately managed, or if communities in the Albertine region become 
disenfranchised as a result of oil exploration activities.187  
 
Petroleum Sector Governance 
Uganda’s Petroleum policy environment – status of regulations and 
legislation 
Uganda’s legal and regulatory frameworks are not up-to-date and exploration activities in the 
country are continuing before the appropriate policies can be put in place. While in the past 
year two Bills were passed by government, and while the National Oil and Gas Policy 
(NOGP) for Uganda does exist, there are several gaps and areas of concern within these 
documents. In many instances the commitments made in the NOGP are also not being 
adhered to.  
The NOGP sets out governance mechanisms based on international best practice to enable the 
conversion of oil resources into development in Uganda. This guideline of principles is clear 
in the NOGP which states that: 
Openness and access to information are fundamental rights in activities that may positively or 
negatively impact individuals, communities and states. It is important that information that will enable 
stakeholders to assess how their interests are being affected is disclosed. This policy recognises the 
important roles different stakeholders have to play in order to achieve transparency and accountability 
in the oil and gas activities. This policy shall therefore promote high standards of transparency and 
accountability in licensing, procurement, exploration, development and production operations as well 
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as management of revenues from oil and gas. The policy will also support disclosure of payments and 
revenues from oil and gas using simple and understood principles in line with accepted national and 
international financial reporting standards.188 
However, the NOGP is not a legal document and thus while it outlines the principles on 
which future legislation should be based, and is thus progressive in terms of natural resource 
management on the continent, it is not enshrined in the country’s legislature. As a result, in 
the years that have followed its completion, many of its guidelines have not been followed in 
practice. 
On 8 February 2012 and on 14 February 2012 respectively, the Petroleum (Exploration, 
Development and Production) Bill 2012 (the Upstream Bill) and the Petroleum (Refining, 
Gas Processing and Conversion Transportation and Storage) Bill 2012 (the Mid-stream Bill), 
were introduced to Parliament. While this is a positive step in the legislative framework for 
natural resource governance in Uganda, several significant gaps and areas of concern exist 
within these Bills. 
First, neither Bill deals with the issue of revenue management within Uganda’s petroleum 
sector. While the government is stated as introducing a Public Finance Bill in order to deal 
with this issue, nothing has as yet been formally introduced to Parliament.189 This is of 
serious concern as no legislation exists at present to ensure that the revenues obtained by 
government from the newfound oil reserves will be used for the public good.190 This is 
clearly misaligned with the guidelines set by the NOGP. 
Second, there are important issues that are not dealt with by either document. The cross-
border issues with the DRC, which shares Lake Albert with Uganda and agreements with 
other neighbours, do not receive any mention.191 No provisions are made in either Bill for 
competitive and transparent bidding procedures, nor do they make legal provisions to 
guarantee that the revenues generated from the oil industry are used for the public good. 
Further, neither Bill contains enough detail on the process of royalty sharing to be followed 
by government.192 
Third, the Bills have been criticised for politicising the management of the oil sector.193 
Provision is made for the establishment of the Petroleum Authority of Uganda, which is 
tasked with monitoring and regulating exploration, development, production, processing, 
transportation and storage of petroleum in Uganda. However, the Bill also empowers the 
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Minister of Petroleum to give policy direction to the Petroleum Authority and for compliance 
therewith. Thus there is a risk to the independence of the authority as it could easily become 
undermined by political interference. Of further concern, is the lack of stipulation of the 
appointment of the Minister of Petroleum by Parliament. Finally in this regard, is the fact that 
there is insufficient clarity on the relationships between different government institutions.194  
The fourth and final gap in the Bills relates to the bidding, allocation and licensing of oil 
rights. While it is positive that the Upstream Bill provides for a competitive bidding process 
for companies to procure the rights to Uganda’s oil, these provisions could be undermined by 
the broad exemptions made by the Bill for the Minister to avoid this process through the 
direct acceptance of bids. There is further a lack of clarity on the contractual relationships to 
be formed between companies and the Government of Uganda.195  
If not dealt with, these severe legislative gaps could prove to be a significant stumbling black 
to the efficient management of the resource industry in Uganda. Concern has been raised by 
several civil society groups that both Petroleum Bills lack adequate checks and balances of 
government’s authority over the oil industry. There is thus a significant risk of corruption and 
abuse of office by government officials in the future.  
 
Parliamentary Oversight 
As was mentioned above, Ugandan politics is still dominated by President Museveni and the 
NRM. Despite the establishment of multi-party democracy in 2005 and the first elections 
hereunder in 2006, there remain major concerns about the stability and entrenchment of 
democracy and multi-partyism in Uganda. These concerns have significant ramifications on 
the functioning and effectiveness of Parliament and indeed the system of governance in the 
country.  
According to Tsekpo and Hudson, the Parliament of Uganda: 
has an important role to play in considering the national budget, exercising control over the activities of 
Ministries and Departments, holding the Executive to account for the fulfilment of its assurances, 
supporting the work of various watchdog institutions, ensuring equitable development and support for 
equal opportunities, receiving petitions from the electorate on matters of public concern, and 
considering proposed presidential appointees.196 
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It has largely been established that the efficient and effective functioning of a parliament is 
significantly influenced by the access of that parliament to the policy process. Importantly, 
under the leadership of Museveni and the NRM, a close link was made between the 
Legislature and the Executive, with members of the Executive also being members of the 
Legislature. Although this placed strict limits on the independence of the Legislature, it also 
ensured that Parliament was a definite part of the policy process. This would appear to be a 
positive sign for the efficiency and effectiveness of the Ugandan Parliament. However, in 
recent times it has been seen that in the practice of policy making in Uganda, the Executive 
has regarded Parliament more as an advisory body rather than as the highest body of the 
people, and thus the suggestions made by Parliament tend to regularly be disregarded.197 
Despite this executive dominance, a positive step towards enhanced parliamentary oversight 
was made after the 2006 elections in Uganda, with the formation of ‘accountability 
committees’. These are chaired by members of the opposition party and are regularly used as 
a platform for asking provoking questions of government and for demanding evidence-based 
answers thereto. However, in 2008 this positive step was somewhat undone by the NRM 
replacing many of these opposition chairs with Members of Parliament deemed to be more 
loyal to the government.198 
One of the most significant oversight mechanisms within the Ugandan Parliament is its 
involvement in the budgetary process. This is significant as such involvement is a rare 
occurrence in developing countries – especially in Africa. In 2001 the Budget Act was 
passed. This Act made provision for the establishment of a Parliamentary Budget Office. This 
office is responsible for analysing the budget and providing feedback to Parliament’s Budget 
Committee, and indeed to Parliament as a whole, in a timely and efficient manner. The aim is 
thus to increase the quality of Parliament’s engagement in the budgetary and financial 
processes of government.199 
Included in the Parliamentary Budget Committee are the chairpersons of all other 
Parliamentary Committees as ex officio members, making it the height of parliamentary 
oversight. According to Tsekpo and Hudson: 
The Budget Act sets out the role of the Budget Committee as being: to focus on the preliminary 
estimates and the macroeconomic plan and programs and submit recommendations to the Speaker; to 
consider the National Budget and compile amendments and refer them to the relevant Committees; and, 
to carry on such other functions relating to the Budget as may be assigned to it by Parliament under the 
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Act or any other law in force. The Budget Act requires that every bill introduced into Parliament be 
accompanied by an explanation of its financial implications and that such explanations are tabled 
alongside bills for their first reading and consideration by the relevant Committee. Significantly, 
Parliament now has the power to defer bills to another financial year so that their potential impact can 
be properly considered.200  
Thus it can be seen that despite the fact that the Parliamentary Budget Office operates under 
significant resource restraints, its existence has indeed strengthened and increased 
Parliaments oversight role in Uganda. This bodes well for the future management of oil 
revenues by government.  
However, in other respects Parliament has been seen to have a lack of oversight in Ugandan 
politics. A clear example has been the development of Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Action 
Plan (PEAP). It has been seen that in the development and implementation of the PEAP, 
Parliament has played only a very limited role. Indeed there was no initial approval required 
from Parliament for the PEAP; there was no official parliamentary debate of the PEAP nor of 
its review; and Parliament has had no involvement in the Annual PEAP Implementation 
Review. While Uganda’s PEAP has been hailed by developed countries as a model of its 
kind, the lack of importance placed on the involvement of Parliament in this process is of 
concern. 201 
 
Transparency in the Petroleum Sector of Uganda 
In recent years several instances have indicated a decrease in the entrenchment of democracy 
and good governance in Uganda. Of note is the recentralisation of power in the Presidency as 
indicated by the lifting of presidential term limits as explained above. Transparency is 
intrinsically linked to the mechanisms of good governance in a country and is a common 
feature in strong, functioning democracies. Transparency is also a fundamental cog in the 
wheel of effective management of natural resources. 
 Revenue Transparency 
While Uganda is not yet a member of the EITI, provision is made in the NOGP for steps to be 
taken towards commitment to, and implementation of, this initiative. Several other important 
factors have also recently shown a greater commitment on the part of the Ugandan 
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government to revenue transparency in the oil industry. The NOGP stipulates provisions for 
the creation of a Petroleum Authority (a provision which was codified in the Upstream Bill), 
a petroleum directorate and a national oil company. It also makes certain provisions for the 
implementation of the EITI in the future, although it does not fully commit to the initiative.202 
The continued development of the Uganda legislative framework, as detailed above, is also 
an indication of increased and continued will by the Ugandan government to revenue 
transparency. A further positive development in this regard has been the involvement of 
several civil society organisations in transparency campaigns in Uganda. These include the 
establishment of a PWYP coalition and a Civil Society Coalition on Oil – which has been 
committed to comprehensive oil industry monitoring.203  
Expenditure Transparency 
Uganda was ranked 55th in the 2010 Open Budget Survey, which is indicative of increased 
budget transparency in recent years. Despite this positive trend, and while some important 
documents have recently been made publically available, in-year spending reports remain 
inaccessible, thus increasing the difficulty of tracking government income receipts, 
expenditures and borrowings on a yearly basis.204 Questions were raised about the Ugandan 
government’s expenditure priorities in 2011 after it purchased eight fighter jets and other 
military equipment from Russia at a cost of USD $744 million. These purchases were made 
without the approval of Parliament, and Members of Parliament have since challenged 
President Museveni over the legality of these purchases.205    
Freedom of Information 
The Access to Information (ATI) Act of 2005 allows for the public review of government 
information. However restrictions are made thereof in cases where such information is seen 
to be of a commercially sensitive nature, unless it can be shown that this information is to be 
in the public interest. Thus in practice it can be seen that there is a large amount of continued 
secrecy within the extractive industry in Uganda. Another concerning element of these 
regulations is the costs which are stipulated in relation to the release of information. This 
makes access to information more difficult and is clearly in opposition to the spirit of the 
Ugandan Constitution which sets the right to information as a fundamental provision.206 
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Community tensions and the risk of conflict in Uganda  
The discovery of oil in the Albertine Graben coincides with one of the poorest and most 
conflict prone regions in Uganda. There are several areas of concern relating to the possible 
escalation of violence and conflict in this region as a result of oil. 
 Militarisation of the region 
As was mentioned above, in 2010 it was decided that Uganda’s Presidential Guard Brigade 
would be integrated into the Ugandan army’s Special Forces unit. Further, these forces have 
been deployed to the oil regions to increase the security thereof. From the perspective of good 
governance, the leader of these forces being the President’s son is a concerning indicator of 
increased personalisation of control by President Museveni.207  
Of additional concern in the Albertine Graben, is its proximity to several conflict risks. The 
Ugandan rebel group – the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) – are present in the Eastern DRC 
on the border with the oil exploration sights. With reported attacks having been made by the 
ADF in 2007, their proximity to the oil sights could be of future concern for the security and 
stability of the region.208 
Within the other border of this region, that of South Sudan, is the LRA. While it has been 
claimed that the LRA will not return to Uganda, it is worth noting that the Amuru and Atiak 
regions, both of which are current sights for oil exploration, are the former heartland of the 
LRA.209 
 Expectations of the locals 
With the Ugandan oil discoveries having occurred in one of the poorest and least developed 
areas of the country, there is a serious risk that tensions and possible violence could result if 
the expectations of the locals are not sufficiently managed by government. It has been shown 
that lack of information with regards to the distribution of oil revenues, can fuel tensions and 
result in conflict. For example, in Sudan the lack of information and transparency about the 
revenue distribution between the Sudanese and South Sudanese governments, has increased 
the tensions and mistrust between the two governments and has at times resulted in direct 
violence and conflict. 
In Uganda there are already worrying signs that indicate a lack of transparency regarding 
royalty sharing. The Upstream Petroleum Bill does make some reference to the distribution of 
oil revenues. It specifies that 85% will be distributed to Central Government, and 15% to 
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Regional and Local government. However, further than this, it makes no mention of more 
specific details regarding royalty sharing. There are several traditional forms of institutions in 
the region under exploration, such as the Bunyoro Kingdom. Several sources have indicated 
that if the demands of these local kingdoms are not taken into account and if they are not 
considered in royalty sharing agreements the result may indeed be conflict.210   
There are also several expectations which exist in the local communities surrounding Lake 
Albert. Many people are hopeful that the new oil activities will result in increased jobs for 
locals in the area. Others have expectations of increased infrastructure, such as roads and 
electricity. However, the experience of the locals thus far has been disappointing. Tullow Oil 
is the main commercial oil company operating in the region at present. When roads have been 
made, these have only been to provide direct access to oil sights and have not improved the 
wider transport infrastructure in the surrounding communities. Where jobs have been created 
for locals, these have been of a temporary nature and have thus not met the expectations of 
the people.211  
Further, there have already been several concerning developments in the region. There are 
widespread rumours that several local communities will be relocated to make room for the 
construction of oil refineries. As such, some local farmers are not planting crops in case they 
are uprooted and forced to leave their farms behind. Some locals have also already felt the 
costs of the oil activities in the region. When seismic tests were conducted on Lake Albert 
local fishermen were prevented from accessing the lake for several days. They were not 
compensated for the days of fishing lost to them. Some fishermen have since complained of a 
lack of fish and have blamed the seismic testing for having disrupted the fishes breeding 
patterns.212 If these costs continue to be incurred by the local population without 
compensation, combined with disappointments if expectations are not met, the result could be 
the creation of severe tensions in the region.  
 
Variations from International Best Practice 
Uganda has several significant warning signs in terms of its legal, regulatory and institutional 
frameworks for effective governance of its petroleum sector. This section will thus seek to 
examine Uganda’s frameworks discussed above, with the emerging theories discussed in the 
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previous section of this study, so as to expose the country’s variations from international best 
practice. 
One of the most concerning factors present in Uganda is the democratic breakdown which 
has been witnessed in recent years, as described previously. At the start of the country’s 
journey as a future petro-state, this is a severe warning sign. This is echoed in the emerging 
literature. Jensen and Wantchekon213 have shown a negative causal relationship between 
resource abundance and the level of democracy in Africa; with democracy already declining 
in Uganda there are thus immense risks of complete democratic breakdown in the future. 
Further, these authors discuss the link between executive control of decision making in the 
natural resources sector, and indeed executive dominance in general, as another risk factor 
towards democratic decline. Finally, Bratton examines lack of alternation on country 
leadership as a further risk factor in this regard. This is also in line with the work of 
Omgba214 on lengths of tenure in resource abundant countries. With the executive dominance 
in Uganda, as well as the change of presidential terms limits and strong signs of neo-
patrimonialism, Uganda sits very far from international best practice in this area. 
Shaxson215 argues that traditional theories about market volatility have not sufficiently 
prevented countries in Africa from suffering from the negative effects thereof. As such, he 
emphasises the importance of strong and comprehensive oil contracts to protect countries 
from market volatility. In Uganda, although oil licensing is covered in some of the legislative 
frameworks, the politicisation and broad exemptions for the Minister thereof are concerning 
signs according to international best practice. In line with this, Gary and Karl216 discuss the 
role of corporate players in the extractive industries. From their arguments it becomes clear 
that if there is lack of clarity on the relationship between oil companies and government, as is 
the case in Uganda’s legislation, then there can be serious repercussions in terms of abuses by 
corporate players.  
Ross217 discusses the relationship between natural resources and poverty and argues that in 
order to mitigate the negative effects of natural resource abundance on poverty, governments 
need to increase export diversification and transparency. While there appears to be some level 
of institutional commitment to transparency in Uganda, the lack of commitment to the EITI 
by government is an area of concern. Similarly, the very high levels of corruption in Uganda 
are a further risk for the future transparency in the governance of the petroleum sector.  
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Finally, Ross218 also discusses the risk of distributional conflicts as a result of uneven 
revenue distribution. This is an area where the Ugandan government may face serious 
concern, especially in light of the significant warning signs for the development of conflict 
already discussed. 
It thus becomes clear that in many ways Uganda is far from achieving the standards of 
international best practice in the management of the country’s newfound oil resources. As the 
country begins its journey towards becoming a petro-state and revenues begin to accrue the 
warning signs highlighted above, will serve to increase the risk of the resource curse for 
Uganda.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
hat becomes clear from this study is that there is a growing body of emerging 
literature in the field of natural resource governance. The extensive traditional 
theories examined in this study have largely been shown to lack relevance or 
to propose inadequate policy prescriptions for the African continent, when policy 
prescriptions are made at all. The emerging literature seeks to fill this gap, by focusing on 
policy relevant studies, making viable prescriptions for tackling the resource curse, which is 
largely aimed towards African states. This study has in particular exposed an analysed those 
policy prescriptions which are most relevant for African policy makers. 
Having examined the differences between the traditional and emerging theories of natural 
resource governance, this study analysed two case studies – that of Ghana and Uganda. 
Ghana is shown to be relatively well positioned in terms of its legislative and regulatory 
frameworks, and indeed in terms of the strength of its democracy and mechanisms of good 
governance. Nonetheless, this study exposed several areas of concern within these 
frameworks, which the government of Ghana should address if the strong resource 
governance foundation in the country is not to be eroded in the future. Uganda was shown to 
not have as strong a foundation as Ghana, mainly as a result of the clear neo-patrimonial 
nature of the state. While several positive elements did appear in the analysis of Uganda’s 
legal and regulatory frameworks, some very concerning elements were also exposed. In the 
absence of a strong resource governance foundation, these legal and regulatory gaps do not 
bode well for the future success of the country’s extractive industries. 
More specifically, this study recommends that several areas be addressed by the government 
of Ghana. First, government needs to address the process of democratic consolidation in the 
country through increased decentralisation of power in government. Second, at a societal 
level the high levels of poverty need to be targeted by government in a more direct way. 
Third, while the development of Ghana’s new industrial policy is a very positive 
development, sector specific policies still need to be developed, and mechanisms to prevent 
capital flight and transfer pricing. Fourth, the dominance of the Executive in Ghana needs to 
W 
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be stopped so as to increase the oversight role and independence of Parliament. Fifth, Ghana 
needs to increase its revenue transparency so as to ensure that revenues are distributed for the 
public good. Sixth, in order to increase transparency, the Ghanaian government needs to 
increase the efficiency of EITI reporting and needs to develop legislation in terms of contract 
transparency in the petroleum sector. Finally, the Ghanaian government needs to ensure that 
the FOI Bill is discussed in Parliament and that legislation in this regard is passed as a matter 
of urgency. 
For Uganda this study makes the following recommendations. First, the government of 
Uganda needs to prevent against the continuation of neo-patrimonial rule in the country. That 
is, anti-corruption safeguards need to see greater implementation; the linkages between the 
military and the state need to be decreased; and the term-limit on presidential rule needs to be 
reinstated. Second, greater protection needs to be provided for the natural eco-systems 
surrounding the Albertine Graben so as to ensure against environmental degradation. Third, 
the legislation governing the petroleum sector in Uganda needs to see immediate updating as 
oil activities begin in the country. Specifically, the NOGP provisions need to be adhered to 
more closely by government and legislation needs to be passed regarding revenue 
management, cross-border issues, bidding procedure, the distribution of rent and royalty 
sharing. Fourth, government needs to avoid the politicisation of the petroleum sector by 
decreasing the power of the Minister of Petroleum. Fifth, the links between the executive and 
the legislature need to be decreased in order to mitigate neo-patrimonial tendencies and 
executive dominance. Sixth, Parliament’s role in the policy-making process needs to be 
increased. Seventh, transparency needs to be prioritised by government through membership 
to and implementation of the EITI in Uganda. Finally, the expectations of locals in the 
Albertine region need to be managed so as to decrease the risk of local tensions and 
grievances.   
This study did not aim to conclude whether either country would or would not avoid the 
natural resource curse. As production of oil becomes more significant in both countries there 
is much scope for future studies in this area. What is clear from this study is that there are 
vast differences in the traditional and emerging literature – differences which are significantly 
more beneficial for the African continent. At the same time, studies which are policy oriented 
need to continue in the field of natural resource governance need to continue, especially as 
democratic African states more frequently become resource rich. 
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Regarding the scope for future studies, this paper has shown the usefulness of practically 
analysing country-level compliance with the policy prescriptions of the literature on natural 
resource governance. There is scope for studies such as these to continue across the African 
continent as more countries discover natural resources. This study focused on the petroleum 
sector, but similar studies could be conducted on a range of natural resources. More broadly 
than this, studies need to continue at a theoretical level which provide a more nuanced 
approach to natural resource governance, moving away from the narrowly focused 
perspective of the natural resource curse. Indeed, African governments require more 
practical, forward-looking research to be conducted which identifies policy gaps which 
presently exist. In this way African policy-makers can attempt to mitigate these gaps, rather 
than becoming theoretical case studies only after the fact.      
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